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Abstract 
 
In this paper we analyse determinants of the recent boom-and-bust cycle of the Lithuanian 
economy with the help of a medium-sized macroeconometric model that incorporates a 
functional financial block. Special emphasis is put on the role of credit market conditions 
during the overheating episode. We quantitatively estimate the impact of credit conditions 
and externally funded bank lending on macroeconomic developments. There is evidence 
that  easy  credit  conditions  and  active  credit  expansion  contributed  moderately  to  real 
economic growth but significantly added to overheating pressures by pushing up real estate 
prices,  encouraging  concentration  of  labour  and  capital  into  procyclical  sectors  and 
increasing  private  sector’s  debt  burden.  During  the  boom  episode  buoyant  external 
environment provided strong background for export-led growth, which was later strongly 
affected by temporary foreign trade collapse at the outset of the economic crisis. Model 
results also suggest that government’s discretionary fiscal policies may have contributed to 
economic overheating and severity of the ensuing crisis by not adopting sufficiently prudent 
fiscal stance during the boom episode. The model confirms that more favourable interest 
rate  environment  and  accommodating  fiscal  policies  are  important  for  providing  a 
temporary relief for the crisis-stricken economy but deep structural transformation of the 
economy is needed for the sustainable recovery to take hold. 
 
Keywords: structural macroeconometric modelling, macrofinancial linkages, economic 
cycles, credit, banking sector, housing price bubble 




Šiame  straipsnyje  nagrin÷jami  pastarojo  ekonominio  bumo  ir  nuosmukio  veiksniai, 
pasitelkiant vidutin÷s apimties makroekonometrinį modelį, kuriame įtrauktas ir finansinis 
blokas.  Darbe  daug  d÷mesio  skiriama  kredito  rinkos  sąlygų  ir  bankų  skolinimo, 
finansuojamo  užsienio  finansiniais  ištekliais,  poveikiui  šalies  makroekonominiams 
procesams kiekybiškai įvertinti. Yra požymių, rodančių, kad palankios kreditavimo sąlygos 
ir  aktyvus  kreditavimas  realųjį  ekonomikos  augimą  skatino  nuosaikiai,  tačiau  gana 
reikšmingai  didino  ekonominio  perkaitimo  riziką,  nes  tur÷jo  stiprų  skatinantį  poveikį 
nekilnojamojo  turto  kainoms,  darbo  j÷gos  ir  kapitalo  koncentracijai  į  cikliškumu 
pasižyminčius  sektorius  bei  l÷m÷  did÷jančią  išaugusio  įsiskolinimo  aptarnavimo  naštą. 
Stipri užsienio paklausa bumo metu sudar÷ sąlygas spačiai augti eksportui, o jos žymus 
laikinas  sumaž÷jimas  kriz÷s  metu  stipriai  neigiamai  paveik÷  šalies  ekonomikos  raidą. 
Modelio rezultatai patvirtina, kad bumo metu vykdyta diskrecin÷ išlaidų politika, kuomet 
nebuvo įgyvendinta pakankamai atsargi fiskalin÷ pozicija, gal÷jo prisid÷ti prie ekonominio 
perkaitimo susidarymo ir apsunkinti kriz÷s padarinius. Modelio rezultatai taip pat rodo, kad 
palankesn÷ palūkanų normų aplinka bei skatinanti fiskalin÷ politika yra svarbūs veiksniai, 
galintys  bent  laikinai  palengvinti  kriz÷s  naštą  ekonomikai,  tačiau  siekiant  tvaraus 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Lithuanian economy was among those hardest hit by the global financial crisis that 
erupted in 2008. The crisis also exposed economists’ potential misperceptions of the drivers 
behind economic growth during this decade. Prior to the crisis, it was widely believed that the 
Lithuanian  economy  was  fundamentally  sound,  driven  by  rising  productivity  and  financial 
deepening,  and  the  apparent  overheating  pressures  were  expected  to  subside  in  an  orderly 
fashion in response to tightening monetary conditions. Now it seems that the economic cycle 
was  considerably  more  reliant  on  excessive  borrowing,  overspending  and  non-productive 
overinvestment than was generally perceived a priori. 
The  interplay  between  the  macroeconomy  and  the  financial  sector  in  Lithuania  has  not 
captured much attention in the economic literature yet. Almost all existing macroeconometric 
models were developed prior to or at the early stages of the credit and housing boom and did not 
explicitly incorporate the financial sector, indebtedness of the economy and property prices. 
Unsurprisingly,  they  were  not  well  suited  to  discern  between  economic  activity  driven  by 
increasing productivity and growth based on excessive borrowing. For this reason some models 
tended to produce overly optimistic estimates of potential (or sustainable) economic growth. So 
there is an urgent need to reassess the recent boom-and-bust episode and try to deepen our 
understanding  about  the  implications  of  cyclical  developments  in  the  credit  and  property 
markets for the broader structural macroeconomic trends and viability of the economy. 
In this paper we present a medium-sized structural econometric model of the Lithuanian 
economy. The model includes a stylised banking sector and assigns a role for property prices. 
Financial variables affect the real economy not only directly fuelling demand for consumption 
goods or facilitating investment projects but also via financial accelerator and credit multiplier 
effects.  The  model  is  primarily  aimed  at  examining  the  relative  importance  of  financial 
developments in the recent and economic cycle (constrained, by the availability of data, from 
the  beginning  of  2000  to  mid-2009).  For  this  purpose  we  conduct  the  shock  analysis  and 
experiment with different scenarios. The results can be interesting from the policy  makers’ 
perspective. Our conducted out-of-sample investigation of the adequacy of the model suggests 
that the model or at least its specific equations and blocks could be useful for the short-term 
forecasting. In general, the present model can be regarded as a reasonably coherent framework 
for the analysis of the recent economic cycle. 
The model suffers from the usual econometric problems associated with the relatively small 
data sample (and just one economic cycle episode), and there is also lack of solid economic 
theory for the case of an overheating transition economy. Therefore, limitations of any structural 
macroeconometric  model  under  such  circumstances  must  be  clearly  understood,  and  model 
results always have to be interpreted with caution. For this reason we do not fixate on the 
technical presentation of the model but rather put considerable amount of effort into presenting 
the broader macroeconomic background and economic interpretation of results. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief overview of 
economic developments during the overheating and downturn periods in Lithuania. Section 3 
contains  extensive  presentation  of  the  model.  In  Section  4  we  present  the  model  solution 
outcome, assess the model’s in-sample and out-of-sample performance, and implement shock 
analyses. To analyse the importance of selected financial, policy and external variables for the 














































































































5   
2. Overview of recent economic developments 
 
As  one  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  current  paper  is  to  understand  macroeconomic 
determinants of the recent economic and financial crisis, let us start by putting the current 
economic downturn into perspective. For most of the decade Lithuania enjoyed a very strong 
economic boom: in the period from 2000 to 2007 its GDP grew on average by almost 8%. 
However,  in  the  second  half  of  2008  economic  activity  suddenly  stalled,  and  in  2009  the 
economy experienced a striking 15% contraction. One of the main drivers of the boom-and-bust 
cycle  has  been  the  dynamics  of  domestic  demand  (see  Figure  1).  Credit-fuelled  domestic 
demand provided a powerful stimulus for the overall economic activity during the boom years 
but it collapsed along with the burst of the house price bubble and with more stringent lending 
conditions. 
 









2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Inventory change (contribution to GDP, p.p.)
Net exports (contribution to GDP; p.p.)
Domestic demand (contribution to GDP; p.p.)
GDP growth, %
Domestic demand growth, %  
 
Of the GDP expenditure components, investment took the biggest hit. Following an extended 
period of buoyant growth exceeding 10% per annum, the trend reversed in 2008, and in 2009 
real  investment  expenditure  plunged  by  39%.  Investment  in  manufacturing  equipment  and 
transport equipment contracted by 38% and 80%, respectively, while residential investment was 
slow  to  react  initially  but  rapidly  deteriorated  in  2010.    Despite  exhibiting  slower  average 
growth  than  investment  during  the  economic  upturn,  private  consumption  (being  a  larger 
expenditure component in the GDP) contributed considerably more to the economic growth 
figures. From 2000 to 2007, pro-cyclically rising incomes and abundant credit ensured average 
annual private consumption growth of 9%. In contrast, real household consumption tumbled by 
18% in 2009. 
During the episode of rapid economic expansion the fiscal policy was quite pro-cyclical, 
even though the government managed to keep both fiscal deficits and public debt levels in 
check.  More  specifically,  government  spending  was  most  active  in  the  overheating  period 
between 2005 and 2008, when government expenditure grew on average by almost 20% per 
annum. It should be noted that rising nominal GDP boosted the tax base and tax revenue, which 











































6   
gradually to 16% of GDP by the end of 2008. However, the economic boom masked deep 
structural  imbalances  of  the  public  finances.  As  the  crisis  deepened,  government  revenue 
plunged by 17% in 2009 (the slump in the tax revenue was even larger and amounted to 31%). 
Soaring  cyclical  social  spending  and  relatively  rigid  long-term  commitments  based  on 
optimistic revenue projections implied that government expenditure remained at elevated levels. 
As a result, the budget deficit rose to 9% of GDP and the public debt reached 28% of GDP at 
the end of 2009. The fiscal policy, remaining essentially expansionary, turned anti-cyclical. This 
helped to stabilise the economy but at the cost of very steeply rising public indebtedness. 
 






2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Current account balance (4Q sum, % of GDP)
Unemployment rate (% of labor force)
Annual HICP inflation, %
Unit labour cost growth, %
 
 
Analysing important factors behind the economic recession, one cannot underestimate the 
negative impact of the global trade crisis on Lithuanian exports and thereby on the economic 
activity. During the boom period, growth of real exports outpaced GDP growth. Export growth 
was very robust and resilient to appreciation of the real effective exchange rate. In the fourth 
quarter of 2008 exports started to deteriorate very sharply as a result of collapsing external 
demand – in 2009 real exports declined by 13%, whereas in nominal terms exports tumbled by 
25%.  
Economic  downturn  was  also  clearly  associated  with  sharp  unwinding  of  accumulated 
domestic imbalances. As can be seen from Figure 2, some overheating pressures emerged back 
in 2005 and were gradually building during subsequent years. On the back of strong domestic 
demand,  imports  boosted  and  trade  imbalances  widened.  The  labour  market  was  becoming 
tighter, setting the wage growth above the rate of productivity improvements. Consumer price 
inflation, pushed by rising unit labour costs and pulled by strong credit-driven demand, was 
gradually  rising  during  the  boom  period,  though  inflationary  pressures  were  mitigated  by 
consumers’ switching to imported goods. 
Sharp unwinding of accumulated imbalances started in the second half of 2008, against the 
background  of  progressively  deteriorating  real estate  markets,  vanishing  credit  flows to the 
private sector and plunging revenue from exports. In 2009, the current account balance turned 
positive, as imports fell considerably more than exports. Consumer price inflation was brought 
down effectively to zero, whereas unit labour cost growth turned negative. The labour market 













































































































7   
of 2009 from its lows of 4%. Wages were slower to react, especially in the public sector, but the 
subsequent wage decline was quite substantial. Much of the lost employment and depressed 
economic activity was closely related to the pro-cyclical sectors, namely, construction, trade and 
certain  manufacturing  sectors.  A  sharp  increase  in  the  number  of  corporate  bankruptcies, 
coupled with surging long-term structural unemployment, indicate that the economy is in the 
process of deep structural transformation, which may have a profound effect on the potential of 
economic  development  in  the  future.  Under  these  circumstances,  estimation  of  potential 
economic  growth  or  forecasts  of  future  economic  convergence,  based  on  the  neoclassical 
modelling  framework  or  on  simple  econometric  extrapolation,  may  be  confronted  with 
insurmountable problems. 
 















2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Credit to private sector (bn litas)
Nominal GDP (4Q sum, bn litas)
Average housing price (litas per sq. m, RHS)  
 
Credit growth and property price developments shed more light on the recent boom-and-bust 
cycle, as they were essentially a flipside of the processes in the real economy. Starting from 
miniscule levels in 2003, bank credit to the private sector grew on average by 47% per annum 
until it reached its peak at the end of 2008. House prices more than tripled over the same period 
before market liquidity dried up at the beginning of 2008 (see Figure 3). They had plunged by 
more than 40% from the peak by end-2010. Considerably more than a half of bank loans to the 
private sector directly relate to the development or acquisition of commercial or residential real 
estate, so the bust of the real estate price bubble had a sizeable impact on bank balance sheets. 
In 2009, bank credit to the private sector contracted by 14%, as a result of large write-offs and 
credit rationing in the face of changing risk perceptions. Losses incurred by the banking system 
in the aftermath of the crisis essentially wiped out bank profits earned during the whole decade. 
The  crisis  episode  coincided  with  sharp  rises  in  interest  rates,  especially  on  litas-
denominated loans. One of the most significant developments was a dramatic decoupling of 
interbank rates (Vilibor) from commensurate euro zone interbank rates (see Figure 4), which 
basically reflected loss of confidence in the interbank market amid huge economic uncertainty 
and banks’ urge to price in previously neglected risks. As rates on litas-denominated variable-
rate loans are associated with interbank rates, private sector borrowing cost rose sharply. The 
private sector’s real debt servicing burden was exacerbated by deflationary environment, falling 











































8   
borrowers have been revised upwards materially, and generally there were many indications of 
the imposed credit rationing. An increase in the price of credit and its reduced availability 
arguably had a strong negative impact on the real economic activity, though there must, of 
course, be two-directional causality in this regard. 
 






2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
VILIBOR spread over EURIBOR, p.p.
6-month EURIBOR, %
Real rates on litas-denominated loans to private sector, %
6-month VILIBOR, %  
 
There could be several possible economic explanations as to why the economic slump has 
been so severe in Lithuania. First, the credit and housing price boom has been especially strong 
– low initial indebtedness and low real estate prices provided additional impetus for extremely 
dynamic developments and masked the severity of overheating pressures. Second, it seems that 
due to the peg of the national currency to euro, foreign banks active in Lithuania tended to 
underestimate currency and inflation risks (and, ultimately, overheating and credit risks) of the 
Lithuanian  economy,  which  resulted  in  extremely  favourable  interest  rate  environment  and 
lending conditions during the boom years. Third, following the burst of the bubble the currency 
peg  prevented  depreciation  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  and  may  have  contributed  to  the 
stronger real adjustment. Fourth, the policymakers were not able to resort to active monetary 
policy instruments or ensure an effective pass-through of the accommodative monetary policy 
implemented in the euro area, as the tied-hands monetary policy and an ineffective interbank 
market  resulted  in  divergence  from  respective  euro  zone  interbank  rates  and  thereby  much 
higher  litas-denominated loan  rates  (both for  new  and  many  existing  borrowers).  Fifth, the 
Lithuanian  economy,  like  some  other  countries  in  the  region,  lacked  a  solid  industrial 
“backbone” and was therefore more vulnerable to severe shocks to the non-tradable sector and 
domestic demand in general. Finally, pro-cyclical government spending during the boom years 
boosted  economic  growth  figures  but  eventually  resulted  in  unsustainable  financial 
commitments and very little room for manoeuvre for strategically tackling the consequences of 
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3. The model  
 
The model includes the following building blocks: aggregate supply (production function), 
aggregate demand, income block, labour market, fiscal block, external sector, financial sector, 
rudimentary real estate market and price block (see Appendix A). Most of the blocks are highly 
stylised as we attempt to keep the number of variables low and try to maintain a tractable model 
structure. 
 
3.1. Economic modelling considerations 
 
A most common approach to modelling Lithuanian economy or similar emerging market 
economies is to assume that in the long term the economy follows some equilibrium growth 
path
1, which is obtained by blending theoretical postulations, calibration of parameters, and 
extrapolation of in-sample values of important variables. Short-term dynamics of the economy 
is usually modelled by ad hoc regressions. Assumptions about long-term balanced development 
are important for ensuring models’ structural coherence and help to obtain smoother and more 
easily interpretable model responses to shocks. Unfortunately, as the recent massive structural 
transformation  has  proven,  it  was  virtually  impossible to  have  correct a  priori  estimates of 
balanced  growth  path  of  an  emerging  economy  because  its  balanced-growth  features  (e.g. 
parameters  describing  technological  convergence,  capital  or  labour  productivity)  are  path-
dependent and in principle a priori indeterminate. In other words, such factors as indebtedness 
or economic capital structure, which change dramatically during a bubble episode, inevitably 
have  a  deep  impact  on  the  economic  growth  potential.  In  such  case,  somewhat  superficial 
imposition of postulated semi-theoretical long-term constraints can hardly ensure the correct 
structure  of  the  model  economy.  Moreover,  if  economic  time  series  are  short,  there  is  an 
additional risk that balanced growth estimates will be influenced by current developments and 
those developments in turn will be deemed closer to the balanced growth than they actually are. 
Qualitative  analysis  of  the  recent  overheating  episode  in  Lithuania  also  suggests  that 
standard  macroeconomic  theories,  based  on  strong  neoclassical  assumptions  about  efficient 
markets,  balanced  growth  or  rational  optimising  agents,  may  not  constitute  an  adequate 
analytical  framework  for  the  case  of  an  overheating  emerging  economy.  The  fundamental 
problem is that if one is willing to analyse or forecast out-of-equilibrium phenomena, such as 
formation of economic imbalances, one cannot safely resort to equilibrium theories or balanced-
growth  theories.  And  it  is  precisely  the  imbalanced  development  that  was  the  primary 
characteristic  of  the  Lithuanian  economy  during  a  large  part  of  the  decade:  there  was 
overconsumption,  overinvestment,  excessive  government  spending,  overborrowing  of  the 
private sector, procyclical concentration of capital and labour into booming sectors, bottleneck 
effects in labour and product markets, etc. 
It is quite obvious that during the analysed boom-and-bust episode firms and owners of 
production  inputs  did  not  base  their  economic  decisions  on  long-term  equilibrium 
considerations,  thus  theoretical  equilibrium  conditions  related,  for  instance,  to  wage  setting 
behaviour, investment or production decisions, can be of little use for enhancing internal model 
                                                 
1 See Celov et al. (2003), Vetlov (2004), Rudzkis and Kvedaras (2005) for some of the few existing 
macromodels of the Lithuanian economy; see also the macromodel for the Estonian case develeoped by 
Kattai (2005) and the Latvian macromodel built by Benkovskis and Stikuts (2006), both of which share 











































10   
structure. Therefore, instead of imposing long-term structural restrictions, we concentrate on 
ensuring contemporaneous internal consistency of the model, primarily by using the National 
Accounts identities as a basic framework. 
The simplified structural background of the model is laid out in Figure 5 (see Appendix E for 
variable  explanations). The  blue-contoured textboxes  contain  variables  that  are  modelled in 
behavioural equations, variables in green-contoured textboxes are obtained from identities, and 
variables in yellow-contoured textboxes are exogenous. We loosely interpret real output in the 
upper-most  GDP  identity  as  the  aggregate  supply  determined  by  production  inputs  and 
productive technology. Aggregate supply changes slowly in response to changes in employed 
capital,  labour  or  technology.  Aggregate  demand  is  determined  on  the  nominal  side  of  the 
economy (see the second line in Figure 5). For instance, household income, availability of credit 
and  corporate  profits  determine  how  much  people  and  firms  are  willing  to  spend  on 
consumption and investment. It is very important to note that money creation via credit issuance 
or via government borrowing from abroad is not immediately neutralised by rising prices, and 
these adjustment processes are further hampered by the fixed exchange rate regime effective in 
Lithuania, as the nominal exchange rate cannot adjust. So it is reasonable to assert that nominal 
shocks primarily create imbalances between aggregate demand and aggregate supply. 
 








YN HCONSN GCONSN INVN EXN IMN INVENTORYN, 
exogenous









= + + + + -
= + + + + -
PROFITS YN NETCOMP SCONTR CAPDEPR TAXPROD = - - - -
 
 
There  are  three  main  channels  of  adjustment  of  supply  and  demand  in  the  model:  real 
activity adjusts, prices adjust, and imports adjust. Various price deflators in the model depend 
on measures of balance between aggregate demand and supply, and on other specific factors. 
Once aggregate demand is determined in both real and nominal terms, the remaining imbalance 
between what is actually produced and what is demanded in the model economy is reconciled 
by adjusting real imports, which serve as a balancing variable. Generally, in response to excess 
demand  prices  rise,  and  this  leads  to  higher  sales  revenue  and  higher  profits  of  domestic 
producers (though this is dampened somewhat by the increasing imports share). As a result, 
firms are willing to step up investment, hiring and production activities, thereby substantiating 
yet another channel of real adjustment. The preceding discussion also motivates our choice of 
imports  rather  than  inventories  as  the  residual  balancing  variable  –  in  response  to  excess 
demand  imports  rise  and  weigh  down  on  domestic  producers’  profits  and,  eventually,  on 













































































































11   
inventories were allowed to adjust, it would be difficult to economically interpret the impact of 
their adjustment on profits and the overall economic activity. Moreover, inventory indicators are 
compiled essentially as a balancing variable by Statistics Lithuania. In the analysed sample, 
inventory statistics contain a lot of noise and occasionally exhibit quite peculiar behaviour, 
therefore they are considered exogenous in the model.  
A very important feature of the model is that it has an explicit financial sector. In our view, 
linkages  between  financial  sector  developments  and  the  overall  economy  are  crucial  for 
understanding the recent economic cycle. Therefore, unlike many traditional models, the current 
model differentiates between loans to households and loans to firms, as well as between sight 
and  term  deposits,  and  allows  for  different  interest  rates.  Credit  market  developments  are 
modelled  in  the  context  of  the  broader  economy  and  intuitively  relate  to  both  supply  and 
demand side of the economy. It is also recognised that not only do credit flows matter but so 
does the overall debt levels in the economy (as debt has to be serviced).  
 
3.2. Model data and type 
 
The proposed model is a medium-sized structural macroeconometric model. It consists of 
around  30  estimated  equations  and  20  identities.  There  are  about  60  endogenous  and  20 
exogenous variables in the model. Most of the estimated equations have the error-correction 
form. They are estimated following a two-step procedure: first long-term relationships among 
variables  are  estimated  in  the  cointegration  regressions  and  lagged  residuals  from  these 
regressions (i.e. deviations from the long-term relationship) are then included in the dynamic 
regressions among time-differenced variables. All behavioural equations are estimated on the 
individual basis by the Ordinary Least Squares estimation method. The model is estimated using 
EViews econometric software package. 
The model is estimated based on a sample of quarterly observations that span the period 
from 2000 Q1 to 2009 Q2. Six more quarters (up to 2010 Q4) were used for the assessment of 
model’s  out-of-sample  adequacy.  The  data  sample  is  individually  adjusted  for  lagged 
observations in individual regressions. Where necessary, variables are seasonally adjusted by 
applying the standard Census X12 procedure. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  in  most  cases  variables  enter  the  model  in  normal  (non-
logarithmic) form. This is necessitated by several circumstances. First, some of the principal 
variables, such as credit flows, can turn negative. Second, log-linear regressions are used for the 
analysis  of  relationships  between  growth  rates  of  variables  (and  thus  are  very  useful  for 
macromodels  with  a  focus  on  long-term  balanced-growth)  but  in  the  current  case  some 
variables, especially credit variables, exhibited tremendous variation in growth rates due to a 
low initial base. For this reason it often proved economically unreasonable to expect stable 
relationships among variables in their logarithmic form. The downside of this choice is that it 
makes economic interpretation of regression coefficient values less straightforward. 
 
3.3. Modelling productive capacity of the economy 
 
We start our detailed exposition of the model structure with the analysis of the productive 
capacity  of  the  economy.  It  is  determined  directly  by  the  existing  technology  (production 
function) and employment of production factors, namely, capital and labour. Firms gradually 
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3.3.1. Aggregate production function 
 
The supply side is modelled by the aggregate production function approach. Like in the basic 
Cobb-Douglas  production  function,  real  capital  stock  (K
R)  and  labour  (L)  employed  in  the 
production  process  are  main  determinants  of  productive  capacity.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
important to account for heterogeneity of capital. During the recent economic cycle capital 
employed in productive activities (manufacturing) and capital employed in procyclical activities 
(non-tradable  sector  and,  in  particular,  real  estate  development)  were  likely  to  contribute 
differently  to  the  overall  economic  activity  and  long-term  economic  fundamentals.  Since 
reliable statistical data on the capital structure in Lithuania are not available, we use investment 
in manufacturing machinery (INVM
R) and investment in construction (INVC
R) as proxies for 
capital structure in the aggregate output (Y
R) supply regressions: 
 
) ln( 13 . 0 ) ln( 15 . 0
) ln( 18 . 0 ) ln( 68 . 0 ) ( ln 17 . 0 ) ln(
1
) 94 . 3 ( ) 36 . 6 (




TREND L K Y
− + +
+ + =
         (1) 
R
2  = 0.993; D.W. = 1.511; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
 
) ln( 11 . 0 ) ln( 14 . 0
) ln( 56 . 0 ) ln( 50 . 0 ) / ln( 74 . 0 ) ln(
1
) 09 . 3 ( ) 43 . 5 (
) 87 . 2 ( ) 63 . 2 (
1 1
) 10 . 4 (
R R
R R R R
INVC INVM




  +   +
  +   + − =  
        (2) 
R
2  = 0.717; D.W. = 1.535; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
Here, variable TREND is a time trend. Operator “ln” denotes natural logarithm and     is the 
temporal difference operator, which gives a quarterly change of a variable at hand. A bar over a 
variable denotes the estimated dependent variable in the long-term regressions. Superscript “R” 
indicates real variables, whereas numerical subscripts indicate lags of a given variable. In the 
parenthesis  below  each  regression  coefficient  we  provide  its  associated  t-statistic.  For  each 
regression  we  also  report  the  basic  R-squared  and  Durbin-Watson  statistics,  the  number  of 
observations in the regression and the actual estimation period. 
A few observations regarding the output equation are in place. The constant term in the 
levels regression was statistically insignificant and was removed. Investment in construction is 
lagged for a better fit. Is should also be noted that analysis of various specifications of the 
production function reveals that a robust empirical relationship between aggregate output and 
the capital stock cannot be easily determined for the data sample at hand, so one has to be 
extremely careful postulating theoretical relationship and deriving theoretical factor demand 
functions. The problem is aggravated by the circumstance that reliable statistical data on the 
capital stock are not available, and we have to construct it by the perpetual inventory method as 
accumulated real investment less depreciation. Capacity utilisation at the economy level is not 
known  and  we  do  not  assume  any  sort  of  physical  capital  destruction  aside  from  natural 
depreciation, so the downward rigidity of capital in the output equation makes it very difficult to 
explain the deep downturn of the level of output during the recession. This provides at least a 
partial explanation of why the estimated long-term sensitivity of output with respect to the 
capital stock is rather low. The investment variables used in this regression not only serve as 
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capacities  –  a decline  in  investment  activity  during  the  economic  downturn  should also  be 
indicative of declining productive capacity utilisation. 
 
3.3.2. Modelling dynamics of production inputs 
 
Traditional  structural  macromodels  usually  derive  factor  demands  from  the  production 
function assuming profit maximisation, as well as perfect competition in product markets and 
factor markets. While this could cleraly have some rationale in the case of forecasting models 
with (very) long analysis horizon, this is certainly not the case when we are dealing with a 
relatively short overheating episode characterised by unsustainable growth of factor demands 
and  severe  bottleneck  effects  in  various  markets.  We  therefore  do  not  require  that  firms 
maximise their profits in the model but make a considerably weaker assumption that labour 
hiring and capital accumulation positively depend on profits, as strong profits generally reflect 
business expansion opportunities.  
 
3.3.2.1. Wage and employment determination in the labour market  
 
The  basic  line  or  reasoning  with  regard  to  labour  hiring  decisions  is  that  in  pursuit  of 
increasing profits firms make budgeting decisions and determine what part of their revenue to 
allocate for aggregate compensation of employees. At the same time, economic and labour 
market conditions determine allocation of these funds, i.e. the actual level of employment and 
average wage. For instance, a firm may consider profitable expansion opportunities but in order 
to do so it needs to allocate more resources for its employees – it may result in new hiring 
or/and longer working hours of currently employed labour force (which means higher monthly 
salaries) depending many factors such as tension in the labour market, labour contracts, etc. 
In  the  model,  aggregate  nominal  compensation  of  employees  (GROSSCOMP),  which 
includes  employees’  social  contributions,  depends  simply  on  profits  in  the  economy 
(PROFITS),  as  measured  by  the  operating  surplus  and  mixed  income  indicator  from  the 
National Accounts, and on nominal government consumption (GCONS): 
 
GCONS PROFITS GROSSCOMP
) 76 . 24 ( ) 66 . 12 ( ) 22 . 16 (
86 . 1 53 . 0 10 . 2334 + + − =
−
       (3) 
R
2  = 0.993; D.W. = 2.144; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
 
1
) 77 . 3 ( ) 88 . 4 ( ) 03 . 3 (
1 1
) 81 . 2 (
44 . 0 92 . 0 21 . 0




  +   +   +
− − =  
GROSSCOMP GCONS PROFITS
GROSSCOMP GROSSCOMP GROSSCOMP
      (4) 
R
2  = 0.690; D.W. = 1.928; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
Nominal  government  consumption  is  included  in  the  regressions  because  a  significant 
fraction of the labour force is employed in the public sector, and government spending is to a 
large  extent  comprised  of  compensation  of  public  sector  employees.  Not  surprisingly, 
government  spending  decisions  are  confirmed  to  be  a  very  important  determinant  of  the 
aggregate wage level and, notably, its regression coefficient is much higher than 1 but smaller 
than 2. This makes economic sense: public sector employees earn their wages and spend a large 
part of them on domestically produced goods and services, and then a significant fraction of 
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government spending can potentially have a very strong temporary stimulating impact on the 
economy, especially if it is financed by borrowing from abroad rather than by the tax revenue. 
However, the related issue of the sustainability of the economic recovery supported by fiscal 
measures should never be ignored.  
Whether an increase in compensation of employees will be associated with wage rises or 
with higher employment is determined by employment equations. In the model employment (L) 
positively  depends  on  net  aggregate  compensation  of  employees
2  (NETCOMP),  exogenous 
labour force (LF) and investment in construction (INVC
R) and negatively depends on consumer 
price level (DEFLCONS), which erodes real wages: 
 
R INVC LF DEFLCONS NETCOMP L
) 23 . 2 ( ) 84 . 4 ( ) 86 . 5 ( ) 62 . 4 ( ) 71 . 4 (
04 . 0 59 . 0 25 . 627 04 . 0 71 . 842 + + − + =
−
    (5) 
R
2  = 0.943; D.W. = 0.858; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
 
2
) 99 . 2 (
1
) 16 . 5 ( ) 24 . 4 ( ) 34 . 9 (
) 80 . 3 ( ) 32 . 2 (
1 1
) 48 . 5 (
28 . 0 39 . 0 04 . 0 77 . 0





  +   +   +   +
  −   + − − =  
L L INVC LF
DEFLCONS NETCOMP L L L
R       (6) 
R
2  = 0.863; D.W. = 1.404; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
Equations (5) and (6) can be seen as a reduced-form expression of a very simple model for 
labour supply and demand. In this light, budgets for labour compensation set up by companies 
can be seen as a demand-side factor, which positively affects actual employment. The labour 
force variable is a supply-side determinant of employment. It is notable that over the analysed 
period employment and labour force exhibited quite different, and sometimes opposite, trends 
but  we  get  an  economically  meaningful  positive  relationship.  Sensitivity  of  employment  to 
labour  supply  changes  is  rather  low  but  it  is  not  surprising:  for  example,  if  labour  force 
increases due to natural demographic processes, such as young people entering the labour force, 
it is quite likely that these job seekers remain unemployed for a while. Inclusion of construction 
investment in the employment regression helps to specifically capture the impact of the real 
estate boom and the subsequent bust during the analysed period. Construction is highly labour-
intense economic activity, and we get empirical confirmation in the model that investment in 
construction affected demand for labour. Finally, in line with stylised facts about employment 
we find that changes in employment have a pronounced element of inertia. 
 
3.3.2.2. Capital formation 
 
Capital used in the production process is another crucial determinant of aggregate output. 
Unfortunately, statistical data on real capital stock are not available, so we resort to the quite 
standard perpetual inventory method and obtain the estimate of the capital stock by adding up 
real investment accumulated over a long period and deducing cumulative real depreciation of 
capital. Real investment is taken from the National Accounts, and real capital depreciation is 
calculated as consumption of fixed capital (from GDP decomposition by income approach) 
deflated by the investment deflator. The unknown initial stock of capital is calibrated so that the 
average real quarterly depreciation of capital is equal to 2%. 
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Investment  is  approximated  in  the  model  by  the  sum  of  investment  in  construction, 
manufacturing and transport equipment. Each of these investment types is modelled separately. 
Investment demand is  modelled in nominal terms. As it is real investment that matters for 
aggregate production, we also model investment prices for each type of investment. 
Nominal expenditure on construction investment (INVC) is explained in the model by profits 
of nonfinancial corporations (NFCPROFITS), changes in credit to households ( HCREDIT) 
and firms ( FCREDIT)
3, housing price index (HPI) and adjusted firm loan rates (FLRATE): 
 
)) 1 / ( ( 29 . 1422 86 . 5
20 . 0 26 . 0 16 . 0 22 . 611
4
) 54 . 2 (
1
) 89 . 7 (
4
) 42 . 3 (
3
) 46 . 2 (
1
) 47 . 4 ( ) 76 . 7 (
− − − +





R R Y Y FLRATE HPI
FCREDIT HCREDIT NFCPROFITS INVC
  (7) 
R
2  = 0.993; D.W. = 1.416; obs. 33; adjusted sample: 2001Q1-2009Q2. 
 
)) 1 / ( ( 85 . 1939 86 . 5 ) ( 16 . 0
) ( 15 . 0 14 . 0 ) ( 76 . 0
4
) 50 . 2 (
1
) 01 . 6 (
4
) 22 . 3 (
3
) 71 . 1 (
1
) 36 . 5 (
1 1
) 03 . 4 (
− −   −   +     +




− − − −
−
R R Y Y FLRATE HPI FCREDIT
HCREDIT NFCPROFITS INVC INVC INVC
  (8) 
R
2  = 0.884; D.W. = 1.858; obs. 32; adjusted sample: 2001Q3-2009Q2. 
 
The  above  regressions  produce  logical  results  and  all  coefficient  signs  are  as  expected. 
Investment in construction positively depends on lagged corporate profits, as profits are both an 
important  source  of  investment  financing  and  an  information  signal  guiding  companies’ 
decisions regarding business expansion. Likewise, past expansion of bank credit to the private 
sector can constitute external sources of financing for construction activity (and investment). 
Quite low regression coefficients for these explanatory variables are explained by the fact that 
corporate profits and credit flows are aggregate, economy-wide variables. Higher real estate 
prices,  as  measured  by  the  housing  price  index,  and  more  favourable  external  financing 
conditions, i.e. exogenous firm loan rates weighed against real economic growth, are also found 
to affect positively investment in construction. 
We weigh nominal loan rates against real output growth in investment equations for several 
reasons. First of all, actual and anticipated increase in real output helps to explain why nominal 
loan rate increases did not deter the enormous construction boom
4. Secondly, companies are 
arguably  more  concerned  with  their  revenue  or  output  growth  rather  than  consumer  price 
growth when assessing the burden of interest rates. And finally, investment activity is often 
explained by real economic activity in structural models.  
Construction prices are estimated by the following regressions in the model: 
 
R Y INVC WAGE CMD DEFLCONSTR / 41 . 1 24 . 0 35 . 0 25 . 0
) 86 . 3 ( ) 77 . 4 ( ) 73 . 1 ( ) 61 . 1 (
+ + + =       (9) 
R
2  = 0.982; D.W. = 0.656; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
 
                                                 
3 Changes in credit stock enter the long-term regression because a net change in credit stock rather than 
the credit stock itself constitute actual funds that can be invested in a given quarter. 
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1
) 55 . 3 ( ) 34 . 2 ( ) 13 . 2 (
1 1
) 51 . 3 (
48 . 0 ) / ( 63 . 0 15 . 0




  +   +   +
− − =  
DEFLCONSTR Y INVC WAGE
DEFLCONSTR DEFLCONSTR DEFLCONSTR
R       (10) 
R
2  = 0.736; D.W. = 1.514; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
Here  DEFLCONSTR  denotes  the  deflator  of  construction  investment,  CMD  denotes 
(exogenous)  foreign  competitors’ import  prices in  the  domestic currency  and  WAGE  is  the 
nominal average net quarterly salary, equal to NETCOMP / L. The latter two variables in the 
deflator equation help to capture cost-push factors. The last explanatory variable in the long-
term equation (9), namely, the ratio between the nominal investment in construction and real 
aggregate output, helps to gauge demand pressures on construction prices. It should be noted 
that we use similar constructs as explanatory variables in other deflator equations, too. They are 
very convenient to use as in each case there are specific equations that govern the associated 
demand  component  (in  this  case,  nominal  expenditure  on  construction  investment)  and  the 
supply side (real GDP). It is common to include the GDP deflator as an explanatory variable in 
other deflators’ regressions, and the ratios used in our model play a similar role, only are more 
specific.  
Nominal investment in manufacturing equipment (INVM) is positively related to credit to the 
corporate sector and some measure of real economic activity in foreign trading partner countries 
(WDUR) and negatively linked to the external borrowing cost: 
)) 1 / ( ( 45 . 896
84 . 1760 07 . 0 17 . 1095
4
) 62 . 2 (
) 15 . 9 ( ) 89 . 1 ( ) 32 . 5 (
− − −








        (11) 
R
2  = 0.930; D.W. = 1.430; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
)) 1 / ( ( 76 . 1180
52 . 1685 ) ( 86 . 0
4
) 66 . 2 (
) 15 . 2 (
1 1
) 95 . 4 (
− −   −








WDUR INVM INVM INVM
        (12) 
R
2  = 0.604; D.W. = 1.940; obs. 36; adjusted sample: 2000Q3-2009Q2. 
 
The rationale for  including  WDUR  as  a  proxy  for  foreign  demand  is  that  a large  share  of 
Lithuanian manufacturing production is exported, thus expansion of manufacturing activities 
should reflect economic developments in foreign trading partners. 
It is rather difficult to explain price dynamics of investment in manufacturing equipment 




) 30 . 2 ( ) 57 . 5 ( ) 70 . 17 (
33 . 0 73 . 0 38 . 1 + − =
−
          (13) 
R
2  = 0.632; D.W. = 2.027; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
 
) / ( 48 . 1 59 . 0 ) ( 97 . 0
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  (14) 
R
2  = 0.503; D.W. = 1.945; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
In these regressions prices of acquired manufacturing equipment, which is mostly imported, are 
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plausible explanation is that economic progress in mature economies could be associated with 
technological advances, which makes manufacturing equipment imported by Lithuanian firms 
cheaper. Manufacturing equipment prices are positively linked to foreign competitors’ import 
prices (CMD) and – in the short term – to demand pressures. They are measured as the ratio of 
nominal investment in manufacturing equipment to real GDP. However, statistical significance 
of this explanatory variable is low. 
Nominal investment in transport equipment is related to the trade balance (transport activity 
was  closely  linked  to  the  consumption  boom  and,  by  the  same  token,  high  trade  deficits), 
external borrowing conditions (in the long-term regression) and the short-term dynamics of 
corporate profits: 
 
)) 1 / ( ( 07 . 565 ) ( 17 . 0 97 . 123 4
) 64 . 2 ( ) 96 . 12 ( ) 27 . 5 (
− − − − − = −
− −
R R Y Y FLOANRATE IM EX INVTR     (15) 
R
2  = 0.859; D.W. = 2.099; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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) 04 . 2 ( ) 99 . 1 (
) 75 . 6 (
1 1
) 65 . 5 (
03 . 0 03 . 0





  +   +
−   − − − =  
NFCPROFITS NFCPROFITS
IM EX INVTR INVTR INVTR
       (16) 
 R
2  = 0.709; D.W. = 1.963; obs. 35; adjusted sample: 2000Q4-2009Q2. 
 
Here EX and IM denote nominal exports and imports, respectively. 
Prices  of  transport  equipment  (DEFLTR)  in  the  model  are  explained  by  just  exogenous 
factors, i.e. importers’ prices (CMD) and commodities prices (PEI): 
 
PEI CMD DEFLTR
) 41 . 2 ( ) 78 . 3 ( ) 44 . 2 (
11 . 0 68 . 0 38 . 0 − + =             (17) 
R
2  = 0.318; D.W. = 1.507; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
 
1
) 34 . 2 (
1 1
) 60 . 5 (




  − − − =   CMD DEFLTR DEFLTR DEFLTR       (18) 
R
2  = 0.475; D.W. = 1.955; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
 
Higher  commodity  (and  oil)  prices  are  associated  with  investment  in  cheaper  transport 
equipment. Oddly enough, coefficient on importers prices is positive in the long-term equation 
but negative in the dynamic equation. Several peculiar swings and an apparently poor quality of 
the statistical data series make it extremely difficult to provide robust economic explanation of 
transport (as well as manufacturing) equipment  price dynamics. However, importance of these 
variables in the model is limited, so simplistic analysis of investment price dynamics is justified 
in this case. 
 
3.4. Demand side 
 
In this subsection we analyse the demand side of the economy, namely, we form individual 
regressions for the GDP components decomposed by the expenditure approach. All components 
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3.4.1. Household consumption 
 
Nominal  household  consumption  expenditure  (HCONS)  is  explained  in  the  model  by 
dynamics of personal disposable income (YDP), other income (YDO) and lagged credit flows to 
the household sector (HCREDIT): 
 
1
) 11 . 5 ( ) 79 . 2 ( ) 52 . 21 ( ) 35 . 2 (
56 . 0 29 . 0 15 . 1 29 . 629 −   + + + = HCREDIT YDO YDP HCONS       (19) 
R
2  = 0.995; D.W. = 1.646; obs. 36; adjusted sample: 2000Q3-2009Q2. 
) ( 42 . 0 34 . 0
23 . 1 ) ( 60 . 0
2
) 71 . 2 ( ) 63 . 4 (
) 83 . 8 (
1 1




    +   +
  + − − =  
HCREDIT YDO
YDP HCONS HCONS HCONS
        (20) 
R
2  = 0.779; D.W. = 2.048; obs. 34; adjusted sample: 2001Q1-2009Q2. 
 
Here personal disposable income YDP is obtained by adding net compensation of employees 
and social transfers from the government sector and subtracting net debt servicing cost, which 
equals interest paid on loans minus interest earned on term deposits. The other part of the 
household sector income, YDO, is comprised of operating surplus and mixed income (from the 
National Accounts data), income balance and current transfers balance from the Balance of 
Payments  (BOP). The  reason  for  using  this  “other income”  variable separately  is  that  it  is 
difficult to determine the share of operating surplus or the aforementioned BOP items that can 
be attributed to the household sector and could be readily used for consumption. Indeed, as can 
be seen from equations (19) and (20), propensity to consume out of different income sources is 
hugely different. It is natural that propensity to consume out of the primary income sources is 
very large. Actually, the coefficient on the YDP variable is even larger than one. This excess 
sensitivity of consumption to personal disposable income could relate to the grey economy, as 
unaccounted  income  must  be  highly  correlated  to  official  earned  income  and  could  boost 
consumption figures. If we aggregate both income sources (i.e. YDP and YDO), the coefficient 
on aggregate income becomes 0.86, which is broadly in line with stylised economic facts and 
with findings in other studies. 
Modelling  results  are  generally  in  line  with  earlier  findings  of  research  on  private 
consumption  determinants  in  Lithuania  conducted  by  Ramanauskas  and  Jakaitien÷  (2007), 
confirming an explicit role of credit in the consumption function. Moreover, not only credit 
flows  but  also  actual  indebtedness  and  the  associated  debt  servicing  costs  influence 
consumption  expenditure  (in  the  current  model  –  via  the  impact  on  the  disposable  income 
variable YDP). 
To  obtain  estimates  of  real  household  expenditure,  we  set  up  regressions  for  private 
consumption deflator DEFLCONS: 
 
) / ) (( 36 . 0 / 03 . 1 37 . 0
) 95 . 3 (
1 1
) 41 . 29 ( ) 65 . 15 (
Y IM EX Y HCONS DEFLCONS
R − + + = − −       (21) 
R
2  = 0.963; D.W. = 1.296; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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One of the crucial determinants of consumer prices is the balance between aggregate demand 
and supply. Like in regressions for other deflators, the demand and supply balance is proxied by 
the ratio of nominal household consumption expenditure to the actual real output. The sign of 
the associated coefficient is as expected, and higher demand (relative to supply) is naturally 
associated with stronger inflationary pressures. Another explanatory variable in the consumer 
price equations is the foreign trade balance. The positive coefficient sign confirms economic 
intuition that during demand-driven booms surging trade deficits of a small open economy may 
alleviate  inflationary  pressures  as  people  switch  their  consumption  to  competitively  priced 
imported goods.  Finally, regression (22) confirms a considerable level of inertia of consumer 
prices. 
 
3.4.2. Government consumption and fiscal block 
 
The model contains a stylised fiscal block. Its main purpose is to endogenise government 
consumption, which plays a very important role for the development of the broader economy. 
Government consumption, GCONS, is modelled simply as a function of general government 
income and the real growth rate of the economy, which serves as a crude measure of the phase 
of  the  business  cycle.  General  government  income  is  proxied  by  the  sum  of  three  main 
government income sources, namely income and wealth taxes (TAXINC), taxes on production 
and imports (TAXPROD) and social contributions (SCONTR). These income sources make up 
on average just under 90% of general government income. The regression estimation results are 
as follows: 
 
) 1 / ( 52 . 2650 ) ( 57 . 0 22 . 918 5 1
) 15 . 5 (
1 1 1
) 89 . 43 ( ) 52 . 11 (
− − + + + = − −
−
− − −
R R Y Y SCONTR TAXPROD TAXINC GCONS    (23) 
R
2  = 0.984; D.W. = 1.917; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
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               (24) 
R
2  = 0.718; D.W. = 2.19; obs. 35; adjusted sample: 2000Q4-2009Q2. 
 
Nominal  government  consumption  expenditure  positively  depends  on  lagged  government 
revenue. It also has a pronounced anti-cyclical element, which basically shows that government 
consumption expenditure tends to grow (fall) more slowly than government income during the 
boom (bust) episode, which serves as some economic stabilisation mechanism. 
Dynamics  of  government  consumption  deflator  followed  quite  closely  the  overall  GDP 
deflator, especially in the first part of the decade. For the lack of theoretical guidance and due to 
the  element  of  subjective  judgement  in  the  published  statistical  data,  the  dynamics  of 
government consumption deflator, DEFLG, in the model is explained by simply regressing it on 
the GDP deflator (in levels only): 
 
DEFLY DEFLG
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Government revenue sources are explained in the model by the dynamics of commensurate 
tax bases (or their proxies) and the phase of the economic cycle, when it is significant. Thus, 
revenue from income tax, TAXINC, is regressed on the sum of net employee compensation 
(NETCOMP) and operating surplus and mixed income (PROFITS), and on the real GDP growth 
rate: 
 
) 1 / ( 46 . 1069 ) ( 15 . 0 67 . 277 4
) 02 . 3 ( ) 96 . 26 ( ) 75 . 3 (
− + + + − = −
−
R R Y Y PROFITS NETCOMP TAXINC     (26) 
R
2  = 0.954; D.W. = 0.846; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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  + +   +
− − =  
TAXINC PROFITS NETCOMP
TAXINC TAXINC TAXINC
        (27) 
R
2  = 0.734; D.W. = 1.745; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
The obtained estimates of effective tax rates seem economically reasonable. It should be noted 
that a positive coefficient sign for the cycle phase variable suggests that income tax revenue 
exhibits even larger cyclicality than procyclical dynamics of corporate and personal incomes. 
This  could  be  related  to  procyclical  dynamics  of  unaccounted  economy  but  also  could  be 
affected by changes in income tax rates. 
Production and import taxes are explained by nominal GDP, whereas the output growth 
turned out insignificant in this equation: 
 
Y TAXPROD
) 56 . 22 ( ) 23 . 2 (
09 . 0 80 . 183 + =               (28) 
R
2  = 0.934; D.W. = 1.596; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
Similarly, social contributions depend on net compensation of employees: 
 
NETCOMP SCONTR
) 39 . 64 ( ) 24 . 5 (
29 . 0 84 . 148 + − =
−
            (29) 
R
2  = 0.991; D.W. = 0.443; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
We also model a few other fiscal variables. One of them is social transfers, STRANSF. It is 
important for the model economy, as it constitutes a composite part of households’ aggregate 
disposable income. In our model social transfers depend on social contributions but also have a 
very strong countercyclical element: 
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R
2  = 0.976; D.W. = 1.250; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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In general, large part of general government revenue and expenditure is endogenised in the 
model, and the remaining revenue and expenditure sources are added up as exogenous residual 
variables. This makes it possible to track general government’s total revenue and expenditure, 
budget deficits, debt and its servicing costs (assuming exogenously given interest rates). 
 
3.4.3. Investment and inventory accumulation 
 
We presented investment regressions in Section 3.3.2.2, which dealt with capital formation. 
Here our aim is only to remind that investment is also a component of aggregate demand. It 
should  also  be  noted  that  another  constituent  of  gross  capital  formation,  namely  inventory 
accumulation,  is  held  exogenous  in  the  model  mainly  because  of  statistical  data  quality 
problems.  In  contrast  to  some  other  structural  models,  inventories  do  not  have  the  role  of 
balancing model’s demand and supply. 
 
3.4.4. Foreign trade 
 
Nominal exports are found to positively depend on (real) foreign demand and export prices 
set up by domestic exporters and (in the short term) competitors’ exports prices in domestic 
currency: 
 
) ( 11 . 12930 91 . 6730
) 88 . 28 ( ) 57 . 11 (
DEFLEX WDUR EX
R ⋅ + − =
−
          (32) 
R
2  = 0.959; D.W. = 0.504; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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) 01 . 2 (
  (33) 
R
2  = 0.762; D.W. = 1.772; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
Since we chose to model expenditure components in nominal terms, we multiply (real) foreign 
demand variable by export price deflator DEFLEX. So higher export prices are associated with 
higher exports in nominal terms. One could expect that higher prices should weaken demand for 
exports  but  this  does  not  necessarily  has  to  be  the  case  if  price  developments  are  mainly 
determined  by  external  factors.  Lithuanian  export  volumes  and  prices  indeed  seem  quite 
resilient to price, wage or exchange rate developments over the analysed period. Export prices 
are found to depend positively on competitors’ prices in export markets (CXD), commodity 
prices (PEI) and internal wage developments (WAGE): 
 
WAGE PEI CXD DEFLEX
) 01 . 5 ( ) 55 . 7 ( ) 02 . 6 ( ) 08 . 1 (
03 . 0 13 . 0 68 . 0 10 . 0 + + + =         (34) 
R
2  = 0.973; D.W. = 1.048; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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2  = 0.812; D.W. = 1.829; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
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As was mentioned earlier, real imports are allowed to vary as a residual variable, balancing 
supply and demand in the model. Technically, imports variable is special because imported 
goods and services are already included in other components of aggregate demand and thus are 
implicitly estimated. A separate imports regression could potentially harm integrity of the model 
or lead to explosive loops of the model economy. 
Though  real imports  adjust  to  equate  supply  and  demand  in  the  model,  we  still  need a 
regression  explaining  import  prices.  Import  price  deflator  (DEFLIM)  is  regressed  on 
competitors’ import prices CMD, commodity prices PEI and the nominal effective exchange 
rate NEER: 
 
NEER PEI CMD DEFLIM
) 68 . 7 ( ) 54 . 3 ( ) 85 . 8 ( ) 91 . 8 (
0004 . 0 07 . 0 75 . 0 57 . 0
−
− + + =         (36) 
R
2  = 0.937; D.W. = 0.631; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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      (37) 
 R
2  = 0.811; D.W. = 1.750; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
Coefficient  signs  in  the  regression  are  as  expected.  The  negative  coefficient  on  the  NEER 
variable confirms that higher nominal effective exchange rate of domestic currency is associated 
with lower prices of imported products (in domestic currency). As can be seen from the above 
regressions, import prices in the model are mostly determined outside the domestic economy. 
 
3.5. Financial sector 
 
In earlier sections we already saw that dynamics of credit variables accounted for some 
variation in household consumption, investment and other variables. Here, we try to endogenise 
some of the more important financial variables so that the financial sector can be more fully 
incorporated in the broader economy. 
We start with the analysis of credit to households. In the model the long-term dynamics of 
the portfolio of bank loans to households (HCREDIT) is determined by main sources of banks’ 
loanable  funds,  namely  residents’  deposits  (DEPOSITS)  and  banks’  external  debt 
(BANKDEBT), whereas in the short term the flow of credit to households also depends on 
lagged  housing  prices  and  real  interest  rates  (nominal  household  rates,  HLRATE,  weighed 
against deflator-based inflation): 
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      (38) 
R
2  = 0.995; D.W. = 0.651; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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Bank borrowing from abroad and interest rates on loans are held exogenous because, from 
our modelling perspective, they are largely seen as control variables determined by strategic 
decisions of banks or their parent institutions. The coefficient on real loan rates has a negative 
sign, indicating mostly demand-side dependency whereby a falling cost of real interest rates 
strengthens demand for credit. We should also note that we work with “effective” rates on 
existing loans (deposits), i.e. loan (deposit) rates are averaged over different maturities and 
currencies.  This  implies  that  the  rates  include  time-varying  exchange  risk  premia.  Since 
exchange rate risks did not materialise during the analysed period owing to the currency peg, 
effective rates quite accurately reflect actual costs incurred by borrowers (or depositors’ gains). 
Similarly to bank credit to households, credit to firms (FCREDIT) also depends on banks’ 
deposits,  their  foreign  borrowing  and  real  interest  rates.  In  addition  to  this,  profits  of 
nonfinancial corporations (NFCPROFITS), as an indicator of firms’ ability to repay debt, is 
another important determinant in the regression: 
 
NFCPROFITS Y Y FLRATE
BANKDEBT DEPOSITS FCREDIT
R R
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4
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       (40) 
R
2  = 0.944; D.W. = 1.720; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
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  (41) 
R
2  = 0.864; D.W. = 1.929; obs. 36; adjusted sample: 2000Q3-2009Q2. 
 
Note that unlike in regression (39), here we work with credit flows in the cointegrating 
regression, as we found it easier to link credit variables to lending conditions in this form. In 
general, there are uncertainties about the order of integration of credit variables, and formal unit 
root tests are rather uninformative due to the short time series. It should be noted that modelling 
this  economic  environment  is  very  challenging,  and  we  were  very  often  forced  to  seek 
compromise between economic intuition and technical rigour, and we are generally in favour of 
the former. 
In regressions (40-41) nominal rates on loans to firms (FLRATE) are weighed against real 
output growth. This is one of many possible indicators of real interest rate burden, and it was 
preferred  to  some  other  tried  measures  (e.g.  deflator-based  real  interest  rates)  for  a  better 
statistical fit. 
Turning to banks’ liabilities side, household term deposits (HTDEPOSITS) are regressed on 
total disposable income (YD, which is the sum of YDP and YDO) and inflation-adjusted term 
deposit rates (HTDRATE): 
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    (43) 
R
2  = 0.662; D.W. = 2.282; obs. 34; adjusted sample: 2001Q1-2009Q2. 
 
It turned out quite difficult to find an explicit statistical relationship between private savings and 
dynamics  of  household  term  deposits.  It  seems  that  one  of  the  main  determinants  of  term 
deposits during the analysed period is private disposable income. We also find that dynamics of 
term deposits exhibits a large degree of inertia, which is very natural given the fact that money 
is usually deposited in a bank for several quarters. Interestingly, at the beginning of the financial 
crisis, household term deposits continued growing and reached the peak one year into the crisis. 
This is explained in the model mainly by a sharp rise of real interest rates with the onset of the 
crisis due to both falling inflation and rising nominal rates. 
Sight deposits constitute an important component of broad money in the economy. Given 
that money supply under the currency board regime automatically adjusts to money demand, the 
monetary dynamics is mainly determined by money demand. In line with the standard monetary 
theory, money demand could be modelled as a function of nominal interest rates and a measure 
of economic activity. Accordingly, sight deposits (SDEPOSITS) are regressed on nominal rates 
of term deposits (as an alternative cost of holding money) and personal disposable income. In 
addition to these standard variables, we include outstanding credit to firms and households 
because  according  to  the  credit  multiplier  principle,  banks  effectively  create  money  (sight 
deposits)  by  expanding  credit.  Dynamics  of  sight  deposits  is  therefore  governed  by  the 
following regressions: 
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R
2  = 0.996; D.W. = 1.144; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
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−     (45) 
R
2  = 0.555; D.W. = 1.949; obs. 37; adjusted sample: 2000Q2-2009Q2. 
 
Here we again chose to work with logs in order to obtain better econometric properties of the 
regressions. The signs of obtained coefficients are as expected, and the results are qualitatively 
consistent with earlier studies (see Vetlov, 2005). Also note that credit expansion has a strong 
impact on the dynamics of sight deposits in the banking system but it is also recognised in the 
model that deposits constitute a source of credit financing (see equations (38-41)). This two-
directional dependency is at the heart of credit propagation mechanism, features of which can be 
summarised as follows: as a result of their normal lending activity banks create money, credit 
dynamics is path-dependent and multiple equilibrium paths are possible, circular nature of credit 
expansion may lead to credit cycles, and credit can stimulate aggregate demand resulting in 
higher than the potential growth of real activity for protracted periods. The downside of the 
credit  cycle  is  that  overindebtedness,  malinvestment,  changes  in  risk  perception,  impaired 
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rationing, souring credit quality, depressed aggregate demand and economic stagnation (for an 
extended discussion see Ramanauskas (2005, 2006, 2007) and Kuodis and Ramanauskas, 2009). 
 
3.6. Housing prices 
 
Housing prices are important in the model mostly because they directly affect construction 
investment and credit flows to the household sector. More credit is needed to acquire housing at 
higher prices, and rising prices also facilitate larger individual loans because perceived worth of 
collateral increases. Of course, the perceived improvement of collateral quality can largely be 
regarded  as  myopic  and  non-rational  or  may  reflect  principle-agent  problems  among  bank 
owners and managers. In any case, the observed relationship between house price rises and 
credit growth during the analysed boom episode in Lithuania is beyond doubt. Furthermore, 
housing has a dual purpose as consumption and investment good. Demand for housing, unlike 
for normal goods, may increase as housing price goes up because speculative motives or fears 
for ever decreasing housing affordability may spur buying and outweigh the negative impact of 
a price rise. In reaction to rising demand, housing supply gradually rises as housing developers 
increase construction investment. 
In the model housing prices are determined by disposable income dynamics and availability 
of credit, while real interest rates are also marginally significant in the dynamic equation: 
1
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R
2  = 0.976; D.W. = 1.214; obs. 36; adjusted sample: 2000Q3-2009Q2. 
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    (47) 
R
2  = 0.720; D.W. = 1.886; obs. 35; adjusted sample: 2000Q4-2009Q2. 
 
As can be seen from the above equations, housing prices are associated with highly procyclical 
determinants and their dynamics has a pronounced autoregressive element, which explains why 
they followed the boom-and-bust cycle. Another important thing to note is that the real interest 
rate  burden  is  modelled  by  weighing  nominal  household  rates  against  wage  inflation.  The 
regression results suggest that in the context of extremely strong wage growth during the boom 
period (and thus widespread expectations of falling real borrowing costs) modest interest rate 
movements would have had a very limited impact on the booming real estate market. 
 
3.7. Income decomposition 
 
One major current model’s difference from many other structural macromodels is related to 
the role of corporate profits. In standard models the long-term (or “desired”) values of some 
important variables, such as real wages, employed labour and capital, are derived from firms’ 
profit maximisation exercise. Yet actual corporate profits are essentially left out of scope of the 
standard analysis. That means that no track is kept of actual profit dynamics and the observed 
profitability  of  firms  does  not  influence  production  decisions.  In  our  view,  it  is  a  serious 
drawback because the models rely too much on strong and not very realistic assumptions about 
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not necessarily optimised profits also constitute a major driver behind economic activity in the 
short- and medium- term. In contrast, profits are not optimised in the current model but they 
have a clear role in influencing employee hiring and remuneration, borrowing and investment, 
as we saw in earlier sections. An explicit role for profits is arguably very important for ensuring 
model’s internal consistency, which poses a real problem in policy-relevant time horizons in 
most standard models. 
In  the  model,  mixed  income  and  operating  surplus  variable  (PROFITS)  is  essentially 
obtained from the national income identity. Since this identity does not hold exactly due to 
seasonal adjustment of the model variables, we form the following auxiliary regression: 
 
) ( 00 . 1 51 . 20
) 22 . 141 ( ) 46 . 0 (
TAXPROD CAPDEPR SCONTR NETCOMP Y PROFITS − − − − + − =
−
  (48) 
R
2  = 0.998; D.W. = 2.452; obs. 38; adjusted sample: 2000Q1-2009Q2. 
 
In the parenthesis we have the identity expression for mixed income and operating surplus. Here 
CAPDEPR denotes nominal consumption of fixed capital (capital depreciation). 
Mixed  income  and  operating  surplus  is  a  composite  variable,  and  only  a  fraction  of  it 
constitutes nonfinancial corporations’ profits. In order to endogenise NFCPROFITS variable, in 
yet another auxiliary regression we regress NFCPROFITS on operating surplus excluding bank 
profits (proxied by interest received on loans less interest paid on deposits) and a few dummy 
variables to account for outliers and trend changes in the NFCPROFITS dynamics. 
Endogenised  nonfinancial  corporations’  profits  essentially  close  the  model.  Being  the 
centrepiece  economic  variable  of  the  model  economy,  profits also  have  a  profound  role in 
ensuring stability of the system. For instance, increased demand leads to higher profits and 
overall economic activity but explosive profit growth is prevented because higher demand for 
labour  raises  wages,  whereas  higher  investment  and  larger  capital  stock  is  associated  with 
higher  depreciation  costs.  This,  together  with  rising  imports,  dampens  further  growth  of 
domestic producers’ profits. 
 
4. Shock analysis 
 
Individually estimated regressions together with identities constitute the complete model. 
The dynamics of the system is simulated by standard Newton solution method provided in 
EViews. As a result of the dynamic simulation, we get the model baseline scenario, whereby 
actual values of endogenous variables in all system’s equations are replaced by estimated values 
of those variables. The baseline scenario serves several purposes. First, comparing baseline to 
the actual dynamics of the system we get the basic indication of general adequacy of the model. 
Second, it provides the comparative basis for the shock analysis and other simulations. 
 
 
4.1. Evaluating model performance and forming baseline scenarios 
 
Simulated and actual dynamics of some of the more important model variables are shown in 
Figure B1 in Appendix B. Given a relatively small set of exogenous variables, the overall 
dynamics of the model system is reasonably close to the actual developments of the economy 
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estimation  period,  when  the  economy  experienced  serious  overheating,  the  model  slightly 
underestimates it, as simulated consumer and housing prices, household indebtedness and bank 
deposits are all somewhat lower than actual values. This shows, in hindsight, that economic 
developments  and  thereby  overheating  pressures  were  becoming  abnormally  intense  around 
2007. 
Once we have a qualitative confirmation of good in-sample performance of the model, it is 
interesting  to  check  model’s  out-of-sample  performance  and  the  long-term  stability  of  the 
system. For these purposes we solve the model for the period from 2009 to 2030. Out-of-sample 
data are available from 2009 Q3 to 2010 Q4. For this period we use actual exogenous variables 
and  compare  model’s  solution  for  endogenous  variables  with  actual  dynamics  of  those 
variables. From 2011 onwards, all exogenous variables are frozen at their last observed values. 
Of course, freezing of exogenous variables implies that the associated model solution cannot be 
regarded  as  a  forecast.  Rather,  it  has  two  purposes:  the  out-of-sample  solution  serves  as  a 
baseline for the shock analysis implemented in the following sections and it is also indicative of 
natural adjustment of accumulated imbalances the model economy (absent specific changes in 
the external environment). Model solution for selected endogenous variables is presented in 
Figure B2. 
Let us first concentrate on the comparison of model’s out-of-sample solution to the available 
actual data. As can be seen from Figure B2, the model generally captures the short-term trends 
quite well. The model correctly describes the basic features of internal devaluation environment: 
downward nominal adjustment of wages, deflating housing bubble and deleveraging pressures
5. 
The model also projects sharp real adjustment in the economy – strong declines of real GDP and 
its main expenditure components, as well as a strong dip in employment levels.  
There  are  several  important  aspects  in  which  model’s  out-of-sample  solution  differs 
considerably from actual developments: the dip in modelled real activity and foreign trade is 
overestimated, model deposits are considerably lower than actual, and government balances in 
the model are too optimistic (income too high, expenses and general government debt too low) 
as compared to the actual data. Yet this discrepancy is not surprising at all. During the crisis 
episode the government was fortunate to still have sufficient room for manoeuvre and was able 
to borrow vast amounts of funds to keep up its social obligations. This provided an important 
cushion for the overall economic activity but resulted in a sharp increase of general government 
debt. Moreover, since the government debt was mainly financed by foreign funds, the influx of 
these funds eventually helped to stabilise the stock of domestic deposits in the banking sector 
and the expected drop in deposits did not materialise. As regards foreign trade, unprecedented 
and a priori econometrically unpredictable accommodative economic policies implemented by 
governments and central banks around the world constituted a major driving force behind the 
forceful recovery of global foreign trade, and Lithuanian exports in particular. It is interesting to 
note that by making government consumption, social transfers and nominal exports exogenous 
in the model, much of the systemic discrepancy between model’s out-of-sample solution and the 
actual data can be removed. 
Turning to the long-term dynamics of the model economy, the model suggests that, without 
fiscal intervention and buoyant recovery of exports, the process of adjustment of past economic 
imbalances would have been considerably longer and more severe. In that case one could have 
                                                 
5 At the same time it should be noted that downward adjustment of both actual and model series for 
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expected a period of stagnation until 2015-2016 followed by gradual recovery. Fiscal policy has 
obviously alleviated economic stress in the medium-term but at the expense of sharply rising 
government debt. On the other hand, fiscal policy based on excessive budget deficits not only 
did backstop the crisis but possibly hindered natural economic adjustment processes, and it is 
far from clear whether the long-term economic implications of this policy are positive. There 
indications that nominal adjustment of wages and prices, including housing prices, could be 
considerably deeper should the economy be allowed to run its course. 
 
 
4.2. Temporary increase in loan interest rates 
 
Several isolated shocks to the model economy are introduced and the system’s response is 
analysed.  In  the  highly  dynamic  and  volatile  economic  environment, the system’s  response 
clearly depends on the timing of shocks. For this reason, we arbitrarily divide the data into two 
periods, namely 2003 Q1 to 2008 Q4 (“baseline scenario”) and 2009 Q1 to 2014 Q4 (“baseline 
out-of-sample scenario”), and economic shocks are assumed at the beginning of each of the two 
periods.  As  was  mentioned  above,  in  the  out-of-sample  analysis  exogenous  variables  take 
known actual values until end-2010 and are frozen subsequently. 
We first examine a temporary rise in nominal interest rates on loans to households and firms 
(HLRATE and FLRATE). In two experiments, they are raised by 1 percentage point for eight 
consecutive quarters starting at 2003 Q1 and 2009 Q1. 
 
Figure 6. Percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices 
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As could be expected, a temporary interest rate rise during the boom period has a moderate 
inhibiting effect on the economy (see Table C1 in Appendix C). One of the most pronounced 
channels of the interest rate pass-through seems to be related to investment demand. In response 
to the interest rate shock, declines in investment reach 3.3% in year 2 after the shock. The 
impact is accompanied and reinforced by a sizeable fall in housing prices (by 4.8% in year 2). A 
rise  in  interest  rates  means  worsening  of  financing  conditions  and  thus  directly  negatively 
affects credit flows to firms and households. Impeded capital accumulation dents aggregate 
supply, therefore consumer prices initially are relatively rigid to deflationary pressures (see 
Figure 6). However, the decline in the GDP deflator, which captures broader price tendencies, 
reaches up to 0.4% in year 2. Smaller equilibrium production levels and lower prices result in an 
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likely to be the outcome of the negative reinforcement loop: the downward pressure on wages 
and employment related to worse profitability prospects, together with lower income from firm 
ownership implies that in year 2 aggregate disposable income declines by 1.4% and private 
consumption falls by 1.8%, which in turn has a negative effect on profits. On the other hand, 
there are several stabilising processes. Government spending remains quite resilient, at the cost 
of rising fiscal deficits and increasing government debt. Also, productivity falls less than wages, 
bringing down unit labour costs (ULC) and improving international competitiveness. In the face 
of contracting domestic demand and smaller ULC, economy relies more on net exports. As a 
result of the above discussed key economic developments, real output declines by 0.8% and 
1.5% in the first and second year after the shock, respectively. When interest rates rise back to 
the baseline levels, the dampening impact on the economy vanishes in about one year. Private 
sector takes advantage of lower indebtedness and debt servicing costs and, also, labour costs 
remain lower for some time, which makes profits rebound quickly and even exceed baseline 
levels. This leads eventually to a slightly higher level of economic output, as compared to the 
baseline scenario. 
If interest rates are raised in 2009 Q1, i.e. at the initial stage of the economic crisis, the 
system’s reaction to the shock remains qualitatively similar but the overall magnitude of the 
impact is considerably larger (see Table C1 and Figure 6). For instance, real GDP and consumer 
prices decline, respectively, by up to 3.2% and 2.9%. Again, the main channels of the impact 
relate to investment and housing prices. The interest rate shock directly affects housing prices 
through increased interest burden and reduced borrowing and has indirect adverse effects due to 
declining salaries, employment and dividends. As a result, housing prices exhibit a significant 
12.8% decline from the baseline scenario in the second year after the shock. The decline in the 
housing  prices  has  a  strong  adverse  impact  on  corporate  profits
6.  Declines  in  investment, 
triggered by falling housing prices and deteriorating profits, also reach up to 10.6% in year 2. 
Labour market adjustment provides a crucial stabilisation channel: even though both supply and 
demand effects weigh down on real productivity, which declines by 2.3% from the baseline in 
year 3, wage declines are even larger (-6.1%), and this results in pronounced contraction of the 
ULC. Lower income and employment together with higher debt servicing costs lead to a strong 
consumption  squeeze:  private  consumption  deviates  by  5.9%  from  the  baseline  in  year  2. 
Finally, credit to firms and households drops broadly in line the overall economic activity, so 
their ratios to GDP reported in Table C1 show relatively little change. 
Why does the shock impact during the crisis get amplified as compared to the impact of a 
similar shock at the beginning of boom years? The increased sensitivity of the economy to 
economic shocks is primarily related to higher financial leverage of households and firms. Note 
that  the  private  nonfinancial  sector’s  financial  burden  associated  with  a  1  percentage  point 
increase in effective loan rates is much higher in the case of high aggregate indebtedness as 
compared to the case of low indebtedness.  For instance, in the two-year period starting at the 
beginning of 2003, the 1% burden of outstanding credit to households constitutes on average 7 
million litas per quarter, as compared to approximately 72 million litas per quarter during the 
crisis period. For firms, it stands at roughly 22 and 81 million litas per quarter in 2003-2004 and 
2009-2010 episodes, respectively. When the debt servicing cost is high, a fractional increase in 
its size has a strong impact on household income and corporate earnings, which is not the case 
                                                 
6 During the crisis corporate profits become negative, therefore the percentage changes from the baseline 
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when the overall indebtedness of the private sector is low. Housing prices are directly affected 
by changes in household disposable income, and the financial accelerator linking housing prices 
and credit further amplifies the impact of the shock. 
It has to be emphasised, however, that model regressions are mostly based on boom-period 
data,  and  this  adds  uncertainty  to  the  system’s  behaviour  during  this  severe  economic  and 
financial distress period. Thus, quantitative responses to the interest rate shock have to be taken 
with caution but such analysis helps to understand the role of the financial accelerator for recent 
economic  developments.  The  above  analysis  also  serves  as  an  indication  that  interest  rate 
increases in the financially over-stretched economy at the beginning of the crisis could have 
substantially  contributed  to  the  economy  reaching  the  “tipping  point”.  On  the  other  hand, 
effective interest rates in fact declined by 2-3 percentage points during the crisis by end-2010, 
providing some cushion for the economy. 
 
4.3. Permanent increase in banks’ net foreign borrowing 
 
In this experiment we examine the system’s response to a permanent 1 percentage point 
increase in banks’ net foreign debt relative to baseline GDP (BANKDEBT / Y). The aim of the 
experiment  is to  find  out  how  reliant  on  banks’  access  to foreign  financial  resources  were 
economic developments during boom and bust episodes. 
A permanent increase in banks’ financing from abroad assumed at the beginning of the boom 
period  has  a  temporary  stimulating  impact  on  the  economy  (see  Table  C2).  The  impact  is 
concentrated  on  the  demand  side  but  is  quickly  propagated  through  the  whole  economy. 
Increased foreign financing changes the balance between supply and demand for credit and, as a 
result, credit to households rises by 0.6% in the second year following the shock. Credit-driven 
consumer demand is primarily directed towards acquisition of housing. As housing supply is 
sluggish, real estate prices exhibit an immediate strong increase of 2.4% in the following year 
but the increase is temporary. Demand for housing is accommodated by increasing investment 
(mainly non-manufacturing investment), which rises by 1.2% in year 2. Increased real estate 
market activity and, especially, higher housing prices have a strong positive impact on corporate 
profits, which exceed the baseline by 2.9% in year 2. Increased tension in the labour market 
leads to higher wages (by 0.6% in year 2) and higher employment (by 0.2% in year 2) but 
wages increase more than productivity leading to rising ULC. Higher household income leads to 
stronger consumption and higher imports. Increased imports dampen consumer price inflation 
but the GDP exhibits a moderate temporary increase of 0.2% in year 2. All in all, real credit-
stimulated GDP accelerates by 0.6% in year 2 (see Figure 7) but the effect quickly dies out 
afterwards. Fiscal balances also improve on rising real activity and prices, and the ratio of 
government debt to GDP falls. 
If  we  assume  a  similar  shock  to  banks’  net  foreign  debt  at  the  beginning  of  economic 
contraction, we get quite similar results. However, a notable difference is that a temporary 
positive impact during the crisis is slightly stronger at first but in a few years it turns more 
negative  than  during  the boom  episode. The reason  is  that increased  bank  borrowing  from 
abroad and the related rise in credit supply may help to stabilise the economy in the short term 
but the associated debt servicing cost gets relatively high in a contracting economy (the so-
called  “debt  deflation”).  Drawing  an  analogy  with  the  actual  bank  lending  behaviour  in 
Lithuania, during the crisis there was a strong demand for bank credit as it could provide short-
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viable business projects. Generally, further increase in indebtedness of the private sector is not a 
sustainable solution to the overborrowing crisis. 
 
Figure 7. Percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices 
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We can conclude that in general the system’s response to the shock is in line with intuitive 
expectations. When assessing a possible overall impact of banks’ external borrowing and the 
subsequent deleveraging on the economy, one also has to keep in mind that banks increased 
their foreign indebtedness by roughly 25 percentage points of GDP over the period of rapid 
credit expansion and by end-2010 banks’ net foreign debt declined by some 11 percentage 
points from its peak reached in 2008 Q4. During the crisis foreign banks active in Lithuania 
withdrew very substantial amounts of funding, and given the economy’s “addiction” to easy 
credit, banks’ reluctance to provide credit probably had a negative short-term impact on the 
economy.  However,  the  credit  contraction  was  not  only  a  consequence  of  banks’  lending 
decisions, but rather it was determined by both supply and demand factors, as well as a very 
significant increase in perceived credit risks. It should be also noted that macroeconomic effects 
of deteriorating availability of credit in the model were alleviated by falling interest rates and by 
very sharply rising government debt. 
 
4.4. Permanent increase in foreign demand 
 
In this experiment we examine the macroeconomic impact of a permanent 1% rise in the 
level  of economic  activity  in  foreign  trading  partner  countries (WDUR).  It  definitely  has a 
positive effect on the economy both in the economic boom and downturn episodes (see Table 
C3). 
A  permanent  rise  in  foreign  demand  at  the  beginning  of  the  boom  period  induces  an 
immediate increase in manufacturing investment. As a result, real total investment rises by 2% 
from the baseline in the same year. This leads to a sustained increase in productivity, as the 
impact  on  employment  and  unemployment  rate  is  quite  low.  Higher foreign  demand  has a 
strong impact on firms’ profits, which initially rise by 5% but gradually level off in subsequent 
years. Wages exhibit a moderate increase of 0.7% in year 2 but the effect is long-lasting. As 
households’ disposable income rises, private consumption shows a sustained increase of about 
1% from the baseline. Interestingly, due to the relatively strong increase in imports of both 
investment and final consumption goods, the contribution of net exports remains negative. Firm 
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exceeds  the  baseline  by  about  1.1%  in  year  2  (see  Figure  8).  Stronger  economic  activity 
improves fiscal balances, contributes to higher housing prices and a larger stock of loans to 
households. 
 
Figure 8. Percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices 
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A foreign demand shock induced during the economic downturn produces a qualitatively 
very similar impact on the economy, which is again somewhat stronger. For instance, GDP rises 
by 2% in year 2. Also, the shock eventually induces an increase of 0.5-0.6% in consumer prices, 
which was not the case during the economic boom. The differences in system’s responses to the 
shock relate to a large extent to increased sensitivity of housing prices to economic shocks. The 
stabilising impact on housing prices (of up to 5%) induced by export-related income gains 
encourages  investment  and,  more  generally,  stimulates  domestic  demand  and  price  growth. 
Note that actually foreign demand rose by 25% from 2003 to its peak at the end of 2007 and 
was lower by 7% in mid-2010 and quickly recovered afterwards. 
 
4.5. Permanent increase in nominal government consumption 
 
The last type of shock that we consider is a permanent 1% increase in nominal government 
consumption (GCONS). In this case we make government consumption exogenous both during 
the boom and the downturn period. The impact of the shock is concentrated on the demand side 
(see  Table  C4).  The  effect  of  the  increased  government  spending  on  the  overall  economic 
activity is negligible during the “good times”, whereas fiscal policy has some potential for 
economic stabilisation during a deep structural crisis. 
A permanent increase in government consumption at the beginning of the economic boom is 
associated with an immediate rise in the overall wage level both due to the direct effect of wage 
rises in the public sector and due to the indirect effect of competitive pressures in the private 
sector. Wages immediately exceed the baseline by 0.6% but eventually the gap grows to 1%. 
Labour productivity is only marginally affected, which leads to higher ULC. Inflation is initially 
subdued as stronger demand is to a significant extent accommodated by rising imports but 
moderate inflationary pressures gradually build up (see Figure 9). In this context the impact on 
profits is negative so they fall by 1.7% from the baseline in the first year following the shock. 
Wage  rises  and  a  moderate  increase  in  employment  offset  the  fall  in  income  from  firm 
ownership, leading to a moderate rise in household disposable income (0.8% larger than the 
baseline in year 6), though one has to keep in mind that with growing inflation the positive 
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year 2. Housing prices gradually increase by up to 0.9% from the baseline, while financial 
variables  are  affected  very  little.  It  is  important  to  note  that  in  order  to  keep  government 
spending  permanently  higher,  government  debt  needs  to  grow.  It  gradually  outpaces  GDP 
growth, and by year 6 the debt to GDP ratio becomes 0.4 percentage point higher than the 
baseline. This indicates that in the longer term fiscal stimulation bears an economic cost and 
cannot be regarded as a “free lunch”. 
 
Figure 9. Percentage change in real GDP and consumer prices 
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The shock repeated at the initial stages of the economic downturn reveals that government 
spending can help stabilise the economy in the short and medium term. Again, the government 
consumption  shock  has  an  immediate  impact  on  wages  in  the  economy,  and  the  effect 
eventually grows somewhat stronger than during the boom episode. Just as we saw in cases of 
other shocks, housing prices are more sensitive to shocks in a highly leveraged economy, and 
increases in household disposable income related to wage rises provide a sizeable stabilising 
impact (of up to 2.3% in year 5) on housing prices. This contributes to a pronounced rise in 
investment and productivity (even though wages grow faster than productivity, leading to an 
increase in ULC). As a result, real GDP increases from the baseline by up to 0.5% in year 5. 
The economic impact of the fiscal stimulus is also inflationary, as consumer prices rise by up to 
0.9% from the baseline in year 5 (see Figure 9). It is interesting to note that, unlike during the 
boom episode, in response to permanently increased government consumption government debt 
to  GDP  ratio  declines  by  0.3  percentage  points  in  year  5.  This  suggests  that  government 
spending helps to avoid the deflationary debt trap in the short and medium term by alleviating 
the vicious circle of contracting economy. This is in line with the popular among policy makers 
practice to respond crises by increasing government spending.  
Let us put the results of this experiment in the actual context of the recent economic crisis in 
Lithuania. In 2008 and 2009, nominal government consumption declined, respectively, by 5% 
and 4%, after it grew at an exceptionally strong pace of 22% in 2008. Thus, some of the past 
excess was corrected during the crisis but nevertheless government consumption contracted 
considerably less than nominal GDP or government revenue. A relatively slow decline and the 
ensuing strong recovery of government spending indicate that fiscal policies were essentially 
accommodative during the crisis period. Such policies helped to alleviate the crisis, though it 
has to be emphasised that the model does not say anything about the long-term economic cost of 
sharply increasing government debt owing to the increasing gap between general government’s 
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temporarily stabilise economic situation but little can be said about reducing deep structural 
imbalances: it cannot be ruled out that balanced economic state is characterised by even lower 
housing prices and further diversion of capital and labour resources from procyclical sectors. In 
such  case  accommodating  government  spending  must  be  promptly  combined  with  deep 
structural reforms in order to achieve sustainable recovery and balanced economic development. 
Otherwise, clear short- and medium-term gains could be followed by even larger economic pain 
in the future. 
 
5. Scenario analysis 
 
We  also  conduct  scenario  analysis  in  an  attempt  to  examine  to  what  extent  the  recent 
economic boom can be attributed to the dynamics of four exogenous factors, namely, loan 
interest rates, banks’ borrowing from abroad, external demand and government spending. For 
the purpose of including a proxy for government spending in the scenario analysis we make 
nominal  government  consumption  (GCONS)  and  social  transfers  (STRANFS)  variables 
exogenous, i.e. exclude equations (23)-(24) and (30)-(31) from the model. The ensuing analysis 
has  some  caveats  related  to  government  spending:  it  is  not  a  genuinely  exogenous  policy 
variable, as it depends on the objective economic condition of the economy, which is in turn 
related  to  credit  market  conditions,  external environment,  etc. Thus,  dependence  of  various 
economic  processes  on  exogenous  government  consumption  basically  suggests  that  those 
processes can be to some extent affected by discretionary government policies. One should not 
forget that these policies are themselves dependent on the economic situation. We find that 
roughly a third of increase in government expenditure could be related to exports, whereas 
direct relation with credit market conditions is rather weak. The main reason why we made 
government expenditure exogenous in the scenario analysis was that this allows one to see 
which economic processes could be potentially influenced by discretionary fiscal policies
7.  
This is an in-sample analysis, as we work with data from 2002 Q1 to 2009 Q2. Initially all of 
the abovementioned exogenous variables are fixed at their respective levels observed in 2002 
Q1,  and  the  resulting  dynamics  of  endogenous  variables  is  interpreted  as  driven  by  other 
structural economic variables. Then each of the analysed exogenous variables is alternately 
assumed to take its actual path in order to separate their individual contributions to the dynamics 
endogenous variables. The remaining differences between the sum of individual effects and the 
unconstrained  model  baseline  dynamics  are  interpreted  as  synergy  effects  of  simultaneous 
changes  in  the  analysed  exogenous  factors.  And  finally,  the  difference  between  the  actual 
dynamics of endogenous variables and the unconstrained model baseline is unexplained by the 
model (see figures in Appendix D). Interpreting figures in Appendix D also note that bold lines 
indicate the cumulative percentage change of endogenous variables from the level recorded at 
the  beginning  of  the  sample  (i.e.  the  2002  Q1)  and  the  associated  stacked  columns  show 
percentage contributions of exogenous variables to this change. 
What were the main drivers behind real economic activity in Lithuania during the analysed 
period? As can be seen from the GDP figure in Appendix D, strong economic growth during the 
                                                 
7 Another, technical reason for making government spending exogenous is that endogenous government 
spending in the model is not very sensitive to radical shifts in exogenous variables, so assuming subdued 
economic development government spending remains high implying very strong fiscal stimulus and 
rapidly rising public debt. This is not what we think would have happened in the absense of banks’ access 













































































































35   
boom period was mostly associated with strong foreign demand against the background of the 
global  economic  boom.  However,  the  cumulative  contribution  of  foreign  demand  lost 
momentum in the second half of 2007, and domestic factors gained relatively more importance 
at that time. Dynamics of banks’ financing from abroad and interest rate dynamics contributed 
quite moderately to the overall GDP growth but there were episodes when financial conditions 
did have a very significant influence on GDP dynamics: one is the start of active involvement of 
foreign banks and declining interest rates around 2003-2004, and another one is the period of 
significant financial overheating from mid-2006 when the economy became overly reliant on 
foreign credit. It should be noted that the actual increase in banks’ net foreign liabilities by 
around 30 billion litas during the analysed period had a direct cumulative positive impact on 
nominal GDP by some 21 billion litas over the eight and a half years (in real terms, it constitutes 
about 16% of the cumulative increase in real GDP). Another driver of real activity, namely 
government  spending,  gained  importance  from  2007  when  government  fiscal  policies  were 
becoming highly procyclical. Finally, other factors put together in a broad category that includes 
both  fundamental  factors,  e.g.  commodity  prices,  and  technical  factors,  e.g.  exogenous 
inventories, constitute another quite important driver behind real economic activity. 
Analysis of contributions to employment dynamics shows that employment growth was, 
again, to a large extent determined by growing exports. Interestingly, credit expansion played a 
considerably more important role in determining the level of employment than in the case of 
real GDP dynamics, which is in line with known facts that during boom years the labour force 
was concentrating into highly procyclical and relatively less productive non-tradable sectors. 
Turning to aggregate demand components and household consumption in particular, we find 
that direct contribution of exports to aggregate demand components is considerably smaller. 
Naturally,  only  a  relatively  small  fraction  of  total population  is  employed  in  the  exporting 
sector. We can see from the real household consumption graph in Appendix D that reallocation 
of financial resources through the public sector (i.e. compensation of public sector employees, 
pensions  and  other  social  transfers)  was  the  crucially  important  determinant  of  household 
consumption expenditure. In this context, one should keep in mind that in Lithuania public 
sector workers make up a significant fraction – almost 40% – of the total number of employed 
persons. 
Construction investment expenditure is another aggregate demand component, which is not 
very sensitive to exports. Though export performance was indeed very important in the first half 
of the past decade, starting from 2006 credit supply proxied by banks’ net foreign indebtedness 
played the main role in determining real construction investment. 
As the housing bubble was at the heart of the recent boom-and-bust cycle in Lithuania, it is 
crucially important to examine determinants of housing prices. It should be also noted that 
interpretation of the causes of the housing bubble by economic commentators is surrounded by 
considerable  controversy,  and  there  are  many  differing  views.  The  current  model’s  results 
suggest that the housing price bubble cannot be attributed to any one particular factor (see the 
housing prices figure in Appendix D). However, from around 2005, households’ income growth 
linked  to  rising  government  expenditure  was  one  of  the  main  factors  contributing  to  rapid 
housing  price  growth.  Direct  contributions  of  externally  funded  credit  supply  and  buoyant 
exports  were  also  quite  significant,  though  lower than  that  of  government  expenditure.  For 
instance, at the peak achieved in 2007 Q4, housing prices were at least 19% higher due to 
externally funded bank credit. In line with results of the shock analysis, loan interest rates 
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contribution turned slightly negative in later stages of the boom. Notably, rising interest rates, 
declining exports and contracting foreign bank financing created strong negative accelerator 
effects that significantly contributed to sharp housing price declines during the crisis. 
Interpreting model results with regard to housing price determinants, it is necessary to take 
into account some important aspects. As was mentioned above, general government spending is 
not an exogenous policy variable fully controlled by the government – rather, it depends on 
government  revenue,  level  of  economic  activity,  dynamics  of  exports  markets,  inflow  of 
financial  resources  from  abroad,  etc.  Since  government  spending  is  largely  conditioned  on 
actual economic processes and it is only to some extent determined by discretionary policies, it 
means  that  in  fact  government  spending  is  less  important,  whereas  exports  and  externally 
funded  credit  are  commensurately  more  important,  in  determining  housing  prices  than 
suggested by the figure in Appendix D. Also note in this context, that considerable share of 
credit  was  domestically  funded,  which  further  strengthens  the  impact  of  credit  on  housing 
prices.  Moreover,  the  scenario  analysis  does  not  take  into  consideration  major  favourable 
changes in the interest rate environment that took place at the beginning of the decade (prior to 
the analysed sample), and in this light the importance of low interest rate environment for the 
formation of the housing bubble should not be overlooked. 
During the analysed episode, rising consumer prices posed a significant problem for policy 
makers. Even though the current model is not designed for a specific and robust analysis of 
inflation, it may help shed some light on the drivers behind high inflation. As can be seen from 
the related graph in Appendix D, the contribution to inflation from exogenous structural factors, 
such as commodity prices, was quite significant throughout the whole episode. However, rising 
government expenditure and the associated broadly based rise in household incomes started to 
dominate among determinants of the consumer price deflator from end-2006. The model shows, 
quite  surprisingly,  that  both  externally  funded  credit  and  exports  contributed  negatively  to 
consumer  prices.  Technically,  this  is  related  to  the  above-discussed  result  that  both  banks’ 
active borrowing from abroad and rising exports lead to a relatively strong rise in imports, 
which dampens domestic price pressures. These results again have to be interpreted with caution 
because some inflationary pressures related with rising exports and with externally funded credit 
supply simply show up as a contribution from government spending (through reallocation of 




This  study  is  one  of  the  first  attempts  to  develop  a  medium-sized  macromodel  of  the 
Lithuanian  economy  that  includes  a  simple  but  operational  financial  sector.  The  model  is 
specifically  designed  to  analyse  the  economic  cycle  of  the  past  decade.  Model  simulation 
analysis is aimed at discerning the impact of the interest rate environment, foreign financial 
capital inflows, external trade conditions, fiscal policy decisions and other structural factors on 
recent cyclical economic developments. Transparent model structure and intuitive individual 
equations, which do not rely on strong theoretical assumptions, could be useful for a further and 
more detailed analysis of interesting areas of the economy. Further improved and extended, the 
model  could  also  form  a  coherent  framework  for  economic  policy  analysis  and  short-term 
forecasting. 
The distinctive feature of the model is that financial sector variables are incorporated quite 
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of credit have effects on the economy, and direct effects can also be amplified by accelerator 
effects. More specifically, on the demand side, the flow of credit fosters household spending 
and  business  investment.  On  the  supply  side,  credit-fuelled  business  investment  raises 
productive  capacity  of  the  economy  but  also  alters  the  capital  structure,  as  construction 
investment  is  found  to  rely  on  credit  more  than  manufacturing  investment.  Private  sector 
indebtedness (credit stock)  and  the  associated  debt servicing  have  a  suppressing  impact  on 
corporate profits and disposable incomes of households. Credit also spurs economic dynamics 
through several feedback loops in the model: 1) strong credit flows to the private sector help to 
increase aggregate demand and boost profits and wages, which can potentially result in positive 
second-round effects in the short and medium term, 2) easily available credit positively affects 
real estate prices, which in turn raise perceived collateral value, stimulate construction activity 
and  generally  create additional  demand  for  credit (financial  accelerator  effect),  and  3)  new 
credit raises the stock of deposits in the banking system and a fraction of these deposits again 
serve as a funding basis for further credit expansion (credit multiplier effect). 
The  overall  dynamics  of  the  model  system  is  reasonably  close  to  the  actual  economic 
developments over the model solution sample. Basic out-of-sample projections reveal that the 
model  generally  captures  short-term  trends  quite  well.  The  model  correctly  describes  basic 
features of internal devaluation environment: downward nominal adjustment of wages, deflating 
housing bubble, deleveraging pressures and sharp real adjustment. Model results also suggest 
that without fiscal intervention and buoyant recovery of exports, the process of adjustment of 
past economic imbalances would have been considerably longer and more severe. In that case 
one could have expected a period of stagnation until 2015-2016 followed by gradual recovery. It 
should  be  emphasised,  however,  that  if  the  natural  balanced  state  of  the  economy  is 
characterised by even lower housing prices and further diversion of capital and labour resources 
from procyclical sectors, then the current recovery may prove unsustainable. In this light, it is 
necessary to combine accommodating government expenditure with deep structural reforms in 
order to achieve sustainable recovery and balanced economic development. 
Four types of standard shocks to the economy are analysed in the paper. Their timing is set at 
the beginning of the boom and at the beginning of the economic downturn in order to compare 
the economy’s reaction to shocks in different phases of the economic cycle. We find that the 
model economy generally becomes more sensitive to shocks during the crisis. This is to a large 
extent  related to  the  fact that  in  a  highly  leveraged  economy  housing  prices become  more 
sensitive to changes in household disposable income and financing conditions. 
The shock analysis reveals that a temporary interest rate rise during the boom period has a 
moderate inhibiting effect on the economy, two most pronounced channels of the interest rate 
pass-through being related to investment demand and housing prices. If interest rates are raised 
at  the  initial  stage  of  the  economic  crisis,  the  system’s  reaction  to  the  shock  remains 
qualitatively similar but the overall magnitude of the impact is considerably larger, which serves 
as an indication that interest rate increases in the financially over-stretched Lithuanian economy 
at the beginning of the crisis could have substantially contributed to the economy reaching the 
“tipping point”. 
A permanent increase in banks’ financing from abroad assumed at the beginning of the boom 
period  has  a  temporary  stimulating  impact  on  the  economy,  which  is  concentrated  on  the 
demand side but is quickly propagated through the whole economy. A notable difference is that 
a temporary positive impact during the crisis is slightly stronger at first but in a few years it 
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contracting economy (the “debt deflation” phenomenon). This helps to explain the actual bank 
lending behaviour during the crisis in Lithuania – banks were quite reluctant to lend due to 
changed risk perceptions and due to lack of viable business projects. Model results provide 
some supporting evidence that further increase in indebtedness of the private sector may not be 
a sustainable solution to the balance-sheet, or overborrowing, crisis. 
A permanent rise in the level of economic activity in foreign trading partner countries has a 
clearly positive effect on the economy both in the economic boom and downturn episodes via 
increased  demand  for  exports,  rising  manufacturing  investment  and  enhanced  industrial 
productivity. 
The  impact  of  a  permanent  increase  in  government  consumption  is  concentrated  on  the 
demand side. The impact on the overall economic activity is negligible during the “good times”, 
whereas fiscal policy has some potential for economic stabilisation during a deep structural 
crisis. Government spending helps to avoid the deflationary debt trap in the short and medium 
term by alleviating the vicious circle of contracting economy. This is in line with the popular 
among policy makers practice to respond crises by increasing government spending. Yet again, 
fiscal stimulus must be applied only in conjunction with deep structural reforms. 
Scenario  analysis  implemented  in  the  current  paper  helps  to  identify  drivers  behind  the 
recent boom-and-bust episode. This analysis reveals that strong economic growth during the 
boom period was mostly associated with strong foreign demand against the background of the 
global economic boom. However, contribution of foreign demand to real economic growth lost 
momentum  in the second half of 2007, and domestic factors gained relatively more importance 
at that time. Dynamics of banks’ financing from abroad and interest rate dynamics contributed 
quite moderately to the overall GDP growth but there were episodes when financial conditions 
did have a very significant influence on GDP dynamics: one is the start of active involvement of 
foreign banks and declining interest rates around 2003-2004, and another one is the period of 
significant financial overheating from mid-2006 when the economy became overly reliant on 
foreign credit. 
Results of the scenario analysis suggest that the housing price bubble cannot be attributed to 
any  one  particular  factor.  From  around  2005,  households’  income  growth  linked  to  rising 
government expenditure was one of the main factors contributing to rapid housing price growth. 
Direct contributions of externally funded credit supply and buoyant exports are found to be also 
quite  significant.  Since  government  spending  is  largely  conditioned  on  actual  economic 
processes and it is only to some extent determined by discretionary policies, booming global 
economy and exceptionally easy credit conditions may in fact be very important determinants of 
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APPENDIX B. Model simulation results 
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APPENDIX C. Shock responses of model economy 
 
Table C1. Model response to temporary 1 p.p. increase in loan interest rates 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
Prices  Deviations from baseline 
Consumption deflator  0.01  0.01  -0.10  -0.28  -0.32  -0.12  -0.25  -1.70  -2.89  -2.83  -2.09  -1.35 
GDP deflator  -0.10  -0.37  -0.34  -0.29  -0.25  -0.10  -0.67  -2.12  -3.37  -3.33  -2.34  -1.34 
ULC  0.20  -0.20  -0.70  -0.60  -0.30  -0.10  -0.14  -1.70  -3.87  -4.36  -3.46  -1.84 
    Compensation per 
employee  -0.40  -1.10  -1.00  -0.50  -0.30  -0.10  -0.92  -4.02  -6.11  -5.99  -3.60  -1.17 
    Productivity  -0.55  -0.92  -0.29  0.09  0.00  0.00  -0.78  -2.36  -2.33  -1.70  -0.15  0.69 
Investment deflator  -0.25  -0.77  -0.55  0.11  0.14  0.04  -0.29  -2.83  -4.13  -2.52  -0.49  0.73 
Export deflator  -0.01  -0.07  -0.11  -0.07  -0.04  -0.02  -0.03  -0.30  -0.61  -0.69  -0.51  -0.23 
Import deflator  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
GDP and its 
components  Deviations from baseline 
GDP  -0.77  -1.46  -0.45  0.35  0.16  0.06  -1.15  -3.23  -2.73  -1.61  0.44  1.61 
Private consumption  -0.70  -1.80  -1.00  0.20  0.50  0.20  -3.36  -5.92  -4.12  -2.47  -0.20  1.85 
Government consumption  -0.05  -0.30  -0.65  -0.26  0.11  0.14  0.17  -0.52  -1.11  -1.00  -0.29  0.72 
Investment  -2.40  -3.30  -0.30  1.10  0.60  0.30  -7.82  -10.6  -5.71  -2.10  2.27  3.90 
Exports  -0.01  -0.05  -0.06  -0.04  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01  -0.09  -0.20  -0.28  -0.25  -0.16 
Imports  -0.45  -1.10  -0.67  0.04  0.44  0.26  -3.41  -4.35  -2.26  -1.12  -0.37  0.71 
Contributions to changes 
in GDP   As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Domestic demand (p.p.)  -1.04  -2.15  -0.89  0.41  0.51  0.30  -3.53  -6.37  -4.18  -2.25  0.35  2.19 
Trade balance (p.p.)  0.27  0.69  0.44  -0.06  -0.35  -0.24  2.38  3.15  1.45  0.64  0.09  -0.58 
Labour market  Deviations from baseline 
Employment  -0.22  -0.55  -0.16  0.26  0.16  0.06  -0.38  -0.88  -0.41  0.09  0.59  0.91 
Unemployment rate (p.p.)  0.19  0.49  0.15  -0.24  -0.15  -0.05  0.32  0.73  0.36  -0.08  -0.52  -0.82 
Household accounts  Deviations from baseline 
Disposable income  -0.57  -1.43  -1.05  -0.25  -0.01  0.02  -1.86  -4.75  -5.82  -4.97  -2.54  -0.22 
Saving rate (p.p.)  0.10  0.40  0.00  -0.20  -0.20  -0.10  1.57  2.48  0.97  0.23  -0.22  -0.59 
Fiscal ratios  As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Government revenue 
(p.p.)  0.00  -0.02  0.07  0.06  -0.01  0.00  0.08  0.35  0.51  0.47  0.25  0.07 
Government expenditure 
(p.p.)  0.50  0.64  -0.27  -0.35  0.00  0.04  0.72  1.46  0.45  0.05  -0.70  -0.62 
Government deficit (p.p.)  0.50  0.66  -0.34  -0.41  0.01  0.04  0.65  1.10  -0.05  -0.42  -0.95  -0.69 
Government debt (p.p.)  0.60  1.30  0.70  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.90  2.90  3.10  3.00  1.30  0.10 
Financial variables  As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Credit to households 
(p.p.)  -0.50  -0.80  -0.50  -0.30  -0.10  0.00  -0.04  -0.04  -0.35  -0.54  -0.69  -0.46 
Credit to firms (p.p.)  -0.50  -0.90  -0.70  -0.50  -0.40  -0.40  -0.20  -0.50  -0.60  -1.20  -1.90  -2.10 
Deposits (p.p.)  -0.26  -0.40  -0.39  -0.21  0.01  -0.03  -0.10  -0.10  -0.30  -0.50  -0.80  -0.60 
Household term deposits 
(p.p.)  -0.01  -0.04  -0.18  -0.08  0.05  0.00  0.05  0.08  -0.13  -0.28  -0.51  -0.33 
Other variables  Deviations from baseline 
Profits of non-fin. 
corporations  -6.00  -8.70  0.20  1.50  0.20  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Housing prices  -3.34  -4.81  -1.30  0.78  0.53  0.25  -4.10  -11.4  -12.8  -7.00  0.40  4.20 
Note: Two temporary two-year shocks are assumed. A left hand side panel contains responses to a shock assumed in 
2003 Q1. A right hand side panel contains responses to a shock assumed in 2009 Q1. Percentage deviations of 











































44   
Table C2. Model response to permanent 1 p.p. increase in banks’ foreign borrowing to GDP ratio 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
Prices  Deviations from baseline 
Consumption deflator  0.00  0.06  -0.01  0.03  0.01  -0.10  0.01  0.08  0.02  0.11  0.06  -0.03 
GDP deflator  0.05  0.21  0.09  0.05  0.02  -0.09  0.04  0.14  0.19  0.18  0.09  -0.03 
ULC  -0.05  0.18  0.21  0.12  0.04  -0.10  -0.09  0.06  0.29  0.36  0.25  -0.03 
    Compensation per 
employee  0.06  0.59  0.28  0.15  0.09  -0.09  0.11  0.63  0.52  0.50  0.05  -0.30 
    Productivity  0.12  0.42  0.08  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.19  0.57  0.23  0.14  -0.19  -0.27 
Investment deflator  0.09  0.42  0.22  0.02  0.05  0.01  0.09  0.76  0.59  0.19  -0.17  -0.33 
Export deflator  0.00  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.07  0.06  0.03  -0.01 
Import deflator  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
GDP and its 
components  Deviations from baseline 
GDP  0.19  0.65  0.15  0.03  0.08  0.06  0.31  1.01  0.49  0.16  -0.31  -0.42 
Private consumption  0.31  0.52  0.35  -0.01  -0.11  -0.15  0.39  0.89  0.84  0.15  -0.42  -0.75 
Government consumption  -0.03  0.11  0.26  0.16  0.09  0.09  0.03  0.47  0.48  0.32  0.04  -0.19 
Investment  0.79  1.25  0.12  -0.03  -0.02  -0.10  1.87  2.14  0.73  -0.12  -1.01  -1.00 
Exports  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.00 
Imports  0.33  0.11  0.27  -0.02  -0.19  -0.22  0.35  0.24  0.45  -0.02  -0.24  -0.45 
Contributions to changes 
in GDP   As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Domestic demand (p.p.)  0.39  0.71  0.32  0.01  -0.07  -0.12  0.54  1.17  0.79  0.13  -0.49  -0.73 
Trade balance (p.p.)  -0.20  -0.06  -0.17  0.02  0.15  0.18  -0.22  -0.16  -0.30  0.03  0.18  0.31 
Labour market  Deviations from baseline 
Employment  0.08  0.23  0.07  0.00  0.04  0.04  0.12  0.43  0.26  0.02  -0.12  -0.15 
Unemployment rate (p.p.)  -0.07  -0.21  -0.06  0.00  -0.04  -0.04  -0.10  -0.36  -0.23  -0.01  0.10  0.14 
Household accounts  Deviations from baseline 
Disposable income  0.14  0.55  0.37  0.09  0.03  -0.10  0.23  0.81  0.74  0.36  -0.10  -0.45 
Saving rate (p.p.)  -0.15  -0.02  0.04  0.06  0.12  0.14  -0.14  -0.14  -0.10  0.09  0.22  0.28 
Fiscal ratios  As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Government revenue 
(p.p.)  -0.01  0.02  -0.05  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.06  -0.08  -0.04  -0.01  0.03 
Government expenditure 
(p.p.)  -0.11  -0.28  0.14  0.06  -0.01  0.01  -0.15  -0.33  0.06  0.10  0.22  0.12 
Government deficit (p.p.)  -0.10  -0.30  0.19  0.08  -0.01  0.02  -0.13  -0.27  0.15  0.14  0.22  0.09 
Government debt (p.p.)  -0.14  -0.49  -0.20  -0.09  -0.09  -0.06  -0.17  -0.62  -0.38  -0.24  0.11  0.27 
Financial variables  As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Credit to households 
(p.p.)  0.43  0.59  0.63  0.56  0.50  0.56  0.31  0.37  0.61  0.75  0.82  0.81 
Credit to firms (p.p.)  0.30  0.40  0.40  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.24  0.23  0.32  0.39  0.44  0.43 
Deposits (p.p.)  0.18  0.15  0.26  0.18  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.21  0.14  0.12  0.11 
Household term deposits 
(p.p.)  -0.01  -0.02  0.10  0.06  -0.02  0.00  -0.02  0.02  0.08  0.02  -0.02  -0.03 
Other variables  Deviations from baseline 
Profits of non-fin. 
corporations  1.00  2.90  -0.40  -0.40  -0.20  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Housing prices  2.34  2.40  0.66  0.36  0.13  0.02  1.81  2.45  1.93  0.53  -1.07  -1.26 
 
Note: Two permanent shocks are assumed. A left hand side panel contains responses to a shock assumed in 2003 Q1. 
A right hand side panel contains responses to a shock assumed in 2009 Q1. Percentage deviations of corporate profits 
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Table C3. Model response to permanent 1% increase in external demand 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
Prices  Deviations from baseline 
Consumption deflator  0.02  -0.18  -0.21  -0.10  -0.06  -0.07  0.05  0.02  0.18  0.53  0.64  0.63 
GDP deflator  -0.04  -0.05  -0.16  -0.15  -0.15  -0.08  -0.04  0.22  0.50  0.80  0.85  0.78 
ULC  -0.21  -0.03  0.04  0.03  -0.05  -0.06  -0.25  0.27  0.74  1.17  1.34  1.14 
    Compensation per 
employee  0.56  0.71  0.69  0.60  0.54  0.57  0.66  1.36  1.84  2.43  2.32  2.01 
    Productivity  0.77  0.74  0.64  0.57  0.58  0.63  0.92  1.09  1.09  1.24  0.97  0.87 
Investment deflator  -0.22  -0.10  -0.27  -0.43  -0.54  -0.40  -0.38  0.40  0.58  0.45  0.08  -0.14 
Export deflator  0.02  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.03  0.14  0.18  0.24  0.24  0.21 
Import deflator  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
GDP and its 
components  Deviations from baseline 
GDP  0.91  1.11  0.92  0.77  0.80  0.94  1.16  1.98  1.79  1.68  1.20  1.01 
Private consumption  0.33  1.17  1.12  0.81  0.71  0.88  0.73  2.32  2.59  2.14  1.68  1.27 
Government consumption  0.24  0.54  0.94  0.88  0.82  0.77  0.45  1.12  1.37  1.26  1.02  0.81 
Investment  2.03  1.87  1.57  1.21  1.19  1.26  3.70  4.18  3.17  2.73  1.66  1.45 
Exports  1.74  1.81  1.66  1.54  1.48  1.42  1.37  1.45  1.47  1.52  1.55  1.55 
Imports  1.30  1.89  1.95  1.61  1.40  1.32  1.18  2.25  2.58  2.15  2.05  1.84 
Contributions to changes 
in GDP   As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Domestic demand (p.p.)  0.77  1.39  1.34  1.06  0.99  1.16  1.12  2.69  2.65  2.23  1.62  1.28 
Trade balance (p.p.)  0.14  -0.28  -0.43  -0.29  -0.19  -0.22  0.04  -0.71  -0.86  -0.55  -0.42  -0.27 
Labour market  Deviations from baseline 
Employment  0.15  0.37  0.27  0.21  0.21  0.30  0.24  0.89  0.69  0.43  0.23  0.14 
Unemployment rate (p.p.)  -0.13  -0.33  -0.25  -0.19  -0.2  -0.29  -0.20  -0.73  -0.60  -0.37  -0.20  -0.13 
Household accounts  Deviations from baseline 
Disposable income  0.55  0.95  0.91  0.73  0.72  0.87  0.92  1.94  2.41  2.49  2.25  1.91 
Saving rate (p.p.)  0.19  -0.03  0.00  0.02  0.07  0.06  0.12  -0.34  -0.30  -0.15  -0.07  0.00 
Fiscal ratios  As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Government revenue 
(p.p.)  0.03  0.03  -0.04  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.10  -0.17  -0.18  -0.17  -0.16 
Government expenditure 
(p.p.)  -0.44  -0.26  0.01  0.03  -0.04  -0.13  -0.45  -0.50  -0.14  -0.20  -0.01  -0.05 
Government deficit (p.p.)  -0.47  -0.29  0.05  0.04  -0.02  -0.11  -0.44  -0.40  0.02  -0.02  0.16  0.11 
Government debt (p.p.)  -0.57  -0.81  -0.66  -0.51  -0.48  -0.59  -0.60  -1.20  -1.20  -1.60  -1.40  -1.30 
Financial variables  As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Credit to households 
(p.p.)  0.12  0.20  0.18  0.09  0.03  -0.02  -0.16  -0.12  0.07  0.07  0.16  0.19 
Credit to firms (p.p.)  0.25  0.33  0.31  0.23  0.18  0.18  0.00  0.08  0.21  0.34  0.55  0.75 
Deposits (p.p.)  0.14  0.27  0.31  0.16  0.09  0.08  0.02  0.16  0.27  0.11  0.19  0.30 
Household term deposits 
(p.p.)  0.06  0.15  0.21  0.10  0.05  0.04  0.02  0.14  0.18  0.04  0.06  0.16 
Other variables  Deviations from baseline 
Profits of non-fin. 
corporations  5.00  4.20  1.60  1.00  1.00  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Housing prices  1.67  2.08  1.50  0.74  0.69  1.06  1.71  4.37  5.12  4.54  3.07  2.64 
 
Note: Two permanent shocks are assumed. A left hand side panel contains responses to a shock assumed in 2003 Q1. 
A right hand side panel contains responses to a shock assumed in 2009 Q1. Percentage deviations of corporate profits 
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Table C4. Model response to permanent 1% increase in nominal government consumption 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
Prices  Deviations from baseline 
Consumption deflator  -0.04  0.11  0.26  0.39  0.45  0.50  0.01  0.27  0.48  0.67  0.71  0.65 
GDP deflator  0.07  0.23  0.34  0.47  0.55  0.65  0.19  0.43  0.64  0.84  0.91  0.86 
ULC  0.60  0.70  0.80  0.80  0.80  0.90  0.63  0.74  0.87  0.91  0.90  0.89 
    Compensation per 
employee  0.60  0.70  0.80  0.90  0.90  1.00  0.59  0.85  1.00  1.23  1.32  1.25 
    Productivity  -0.03  0.01  -0.02  0.04  0.06  0.07  -0.04  0.10  0.13  0.31  0.41  0.36 
Investment deflator  0.08  0.14  0.14  0.19  0.28  0.30  0.11  0.31  0.41  0.52  0.64  0.59 
Export deflator  0.02  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.10  0.11  0.04  0.09  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.16 
Import deflator  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
GDP and its 
components  Deviations from baseline 
GDP  0.07  0.08  -0.05  0.04  0.07  0.09  0.13  0.23  0.13  0.35  0.47  0.42 
Private consumption  0.40  0.50  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.40  0.54  0.63  0.55  0.55  0.64  0.62 
Government consumption  0.90  0.70  0.60  0.40  0.30  0.20  0.77  0.49  0.24  -0.01  -0.10  -0.03 
Investment  0.30  0.20  0.10  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.61  0.74  0.55  0.88  0.92  0.71 
Exports  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.07 
Imports  0.76  0.71  0.60  0.45  0.44  0.40  0.75  0.64  0.59  0.35  0.27  0.27 
Contributions to changes 
in GDP   As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Domestic demand (p.p.)  0.49  0.51  0.40  0.35  0.38  0.41  0.65  0.70  0.56  0.60  0.65  0.60 
Trade balance (p.p.)  -0.42  -0.43  -0.45  -0.31  -0.31  -0.32  -0.52  -0.47  -0.43  -0.25  -0.18  -0.18 
Labour market  Deviations from baseline 
Employment  0.10  0.08  -0.03  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.17  0.12  0.00  0.04  0.07  0.07 
Unemployment rate (p.p.)  -0.09  -0.07  0.02  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.15  -0.10  0.00  -0.04  -0.06  -0.06 
Household accounts  Deviations from baseline 
Disposable income  0.12  0.31  0.38  0.52  0.65  0.78  0.27  0.61  0.83  1.11  1.33  1.27 
Saving rate (p.p.)  -0.30  -0.30  -0.20  -0.20  -0.10  -0.10  -0.25  -0.25  -0.19  -0.10  -0.02  0.00 
Fiscal ratios  As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Government revenue 
(p.p.)  0.04  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.03  -0.01  -0.05  -0.07  -0.10  -0.10 
Government expenditure 
(p.p.)  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.10  0.10  0.00  0.15  0.04  0.07  -0.15  -0.20  -0.13 
Government deficit (p.p.)  0.20  0.10  0.20  0.10  0.10  0.00  0.12  0.06  0.12  -0.08  -0.10  -0.03 
Government debt (p.p.)  0.10  0.18  0.34  0.33  0.34  0.37  0.03  0.00  0.07  -0.11  -0.26  -0.23 
Financial variables  As percentage of GDP, deviations from baseline 
Credit to households 
(p.p.)  0.03  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.01  -0.03  -0.03  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.08 
Credit to firms (p.p.)  -0.03  -0.08  -0.12  -0.13  -0.15  -0.15  -0.10  -0.15  -0.15  -0.15  -0.05  0.08 
Deposits (p.p.)  -0.01  -0.04  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.06  -0.04  -0.04  0.03  0.01  0.07  0.16 
Household term deposits 
(p.p.)  -0.01  -0.04  -0.01  0.01  0.05  0.05  -0.04  -0.03  0.01  0.01  0.06  0.13 
Other variables  Deviations from baseline 
Profits of non-fin. 
corporations  -1.70  -0.80  -0.60  0.30  0.50  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Housing prices  0.58  0.51  0.60  0.78  0.88  0.95  0.62  1.21  1.61  2.21  2.28  1.97 
 
Note: Two permanent shocks are assumed. A left hand side panel contains responses to a shock assumed in 2003 Q1. 
In both cases nominal government consumption is held exogenous. A right hand side panel contains responses to a 
shock assumed in 2009 Q1. Percentage deviations of corporate profits from the baseline are not reported if profits 
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APPENDIX E. Variable list and explanations 
 
Variable  Type  Description  Unit  Source 
BANKDEBT  Ex.  Banks’ net foreign assets  Million litas, 
current prices 
Bank of Lithuania (BoL) 
CAPDEPR  End.  Capital consumption  Million litas, 
current prices 
Assumed 2% quarterly 
depreciation of real capital, on 
average equal to National 
Accounts (NA) data 
CMD  Ex.  Competitors’ import prices in 
domestic currency 
Index 
2000 = 1 
BoL calculations 
CXD  Ex.  Competitors’ export prices in 
domestic currency 
Index 
2000 = 1 
BoL calculations 
DEFLCONS  End.  Private consumption deflator  Unit index  Ratio of nominal and real private 
consumption (from NA data) 
DEFLCONSTR  End.  Construction investment 
deflator 
Unit index  Ratio of nominal and real 
investment in construction (from 
NA data) 
DEFLEX  End.  Export deflator  Unit index  Ratio of nominal and real exports 
(NA data) 
DEFLG  End.  Government consumption 
deflator 
Unit index  Ratio of nominal and real 
government consumption (NA 
data) 
DEFLIM  End.  Import deflator  Unit index  Ratio of nominal and real imports 
(NA data) 
DEFLM  End.  Machinery investment 
deflator 
Unit index  Ratio of nominal and real 
investment in machinery (NA 
data) 
DEFLTR  End.   Transport investment deflator  Unit index  Ratio of nominal and real 
investment in transport equipment 
(NA data) 
DEFLY  End.  GDP deflator  Unit index  Ratio of nominal and real GDP 
(NA data) 
DEPOSITS  End.  Residents’ bank deposits  Million litas  BoL data 
EX  End.  Exports of goods and services  Million litas  SL data 
FCREDIT  End.  Portfolio of bank loans to 
firms 
Million litas  BoL data 
FLRATE  Ex.  Average bank rates on 




GCONS  End./Ex.  Government consumption  Million litas  NA data 
GROSSCOMP  End.  Compensation of employees 
(including social 
contributions) 
Million litas  NA data 
HCONS  End.  Aggregate household 
consumption 
Million litas  NA data 
HCREDIT  End.  Portfolio of bank loans to 
households 
Million litas  BoL data 
HLRATE  Ex.  Average bank rates on 
existing loans to households 
Percent  BoL data 
HPI  End.  Housing price index  Index; end-
1998 = 100 
National Registry 
HTDEPOSITS  End.  Household term deposits  Million litas  BoL data 
HTDRATE  Ex.  Rates on existing household 
term deposits 
Percent  BoL data 
IM  End.  Imports of goods and services  Million litas  NA data 
INVC  End.  Construction investment  Million litas  Sum of investment in residential 
and non-residential construction 
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INVM  End.  Investment in manufacturing 
equipment 
Million litas  Statistics Lithuania (SL) data 
INVTR  End.  Investment in transport 
equipment 
Million litas  SL data 
K  End.  Capital stock  Million litas  Accumulated investment, 
assuming 2% real depreciation 
(calibrated with actual data on 
capital consumption); author’s 
calculations based on NA data 
L  End.  Employed labour  Thousands  SL data 
LF  Ex.  Labour force  Thousands  SL data 
NEER  Ex.  Nominal effective litas 
exchange rate 
Index 
1993.06 = 100 
BoL data 
NETCOMP  End.  Net compensation of 
employees (excluding social 
contributions) 
Million litas  NA data 
NFCPROFITS  End.  Net profits of nonfinancial 
corporations 
Million litas  Balance-sheet statistics, SL data 
PEI  Ex.  Price of imported energy and 
raw materials in domestic 
currency 
Index, 
2000 = 1 
BoL calculations 
PROFITS  End.  Operating surplus and mixed 
income 
Million litas  NA data 
SCONTR  End.  Social contributions  Million litas  NA data 
SDEPOSITS  End.  Residents’ sight deposits  Million litas  Approximated by difference 
between total deposits and 
household term deposits, BoL 
data 
STRANSF  End.  Government social transfers  Million litas  Ministry of Finance (MoF) data  
TAXINC  End.  Income and wealth taxes  Million litas  MoF data 
TAXPROD  End.  Production taxes  Million litas  MoF data 
TREND  Ex.  Time trend variable  Units   
WAGE  End.  Quarterly net compensation 
per employee 
Thousand litas  Net compensation of employees 
divided by employed labour, NA 
data 
WDUR  Ex.  External demand   Index, 
2000 = 1 
Weighted GDP index of trading 
partners, BoL calculations 
YD  End.  Aggregate disposable income  Million litas  Calculated ad sum of personal 
disposable income and other 
disposable income, NA data 
YDO  End.  Other disposable income  Million litas  Calculated as sum of operating 
surplus, net income balance and 
net current transfers from the 
Balance of Payments (BoP), SN 
and BoP data 
YDP  Ex.  Personal disposable income  Million litas  Calculated as sum of net 
compensation of employees and 
social transfers, plus interest on 
deposits less debt servicing costs; 
NA, MoF, BoL data 
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